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Abstract
The logic of bunched implications, BI, is a substructural system which freely combines an
additive (intuitionistic) and a multiplicative (linear) implication via bunches (contexts with two
combining operations, one which admits Weakening and Contraction and one which does not).
BI may be seen to arise from two main perspectives. On the one hand, from proof-theoretic or
categorical concerns and, on the other, from a possible-worlds semantics based on preordered
(commutative) monoids. This semantics may be motivated from a basic model of the notion
of resource. We explain BI’s proof-theoretic, categorical and semantic origins. We discuss in
detail the question of completeness, explaining the essential distinction between BI with and
without ⊥ (the unit of ∨). We give an extensive discussion of BI as a semantically based logic
of resources, giving concrete models based on Petri nets, ambients, computer memory, logic
programming, and money.
c© 2003 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to explore, from the point of view of resources and in
the context of a broader investigation of “resource modelling”, algebraic and possible
worlds semantics for BI, the logic of bunched implications [37,38,41]. Propositional
BI, our focus in this paper, freely combines the (⊗; I;()-fragment of propositional
linear logic and propositional intuitionistic logic via the formulation of contexts not as
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Hnite sequences of propositions but rather as Hnite bunches of propositions. The basic
formulation of BI is explained in Section 2. An elementary version of the possible
worlds semantics was brieJy described in the introductory paper on BI [38]; in this
paper that semantics is developed more fully, with a substantial collection of compu-
tational examples. A detailed account of (propositional and predicate) BI’s semantics
(elementary, categorical, and topological) and proof theory (including typed -calculi
and their models), will appear in a forthcoming monograph [42], which therefore in-
cludes some content in common with the present paper, which nevertheless presents a
quite distinct perspective.
Our starting point in this paper is the monoidal semantics of substructural log-
ics, which was independently discovered by several researchers in the late 1960s
[11,27,48,52]. The version of the semantics we use is based on a preordered commuta-
tive monoid M=(M; ◦; e;) of possible worlds. The basic idea is to use the monoidal
structure to deHne the semantics of the multiplicative, or substructural, connectives (I ,
∗, −∗ , in BI’s notation) in the standard way, while using also a standard interpretation
of the additives (→, ∨, ∧, ⊥, 
). In the Hrst, elementary, version of our semantics, the
interpretation of additives is just Kripke’s semantics of intuitionistic logic, formulated
using the comparison relation  in M. When the order is discrete, this amounts to a
semantics of classical logic in a powerset Boolean algebra. In our most sophisticated
semantics, the semantics of multiplicatives is again based on the monoidal structure,
while that for additives is based on Grothendieck sheaves. BI accepts the multiplicatives
and additives as being of equal status, with a semantic treatment of the additives which
is particularly straightforward, requiring no modiHcations in order to exclude certain
properties (such as distributivity) or certain connectives (such as full intuitionistic or
Boolean negation).
Kripke’s semantics of intuitionistic logic may be motivated by a notion of explo-
ration: each possible world models a state of knowledge, or amount of information,
and states of knowledge, or amounts of information, are related by a comparison re-
lation. The worlds w and v stand in relation w v just in case w models a “larger”
state of knowledge. The forcing relationship w |=’ asserts that w is suNcient knowl-
edge to support proposition ’. From a similar philosophical perspective, our preordered
monoid semantics of BI may be motivated by the notion of resource: each possible
world models a quantity of resource. Quantities of resource m and n may be combined,
to form a new quantity of resource, m◦n, and quantities of resource, m and n, may be
compared, m n, just as amounts of information may be compared. BrieJy, we think
of the forcing relation m |=’ as asserting that the resources m “are suNcient to make
’ true”.
The notion of resource, encompassing concepts such as processor time, memory,
cost of components and energy requirements, has a basic role in computational systems,
where it is a central organizing concept that guides development. Indeed, in his seminal
text on operating systems [5], which includes a discussion of resource of rare clarity,
Brinch Hansen states:
The word resource covers physical components, processes, procedures and data
structures; in short, any object referenced by computations.
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Particularly important here is the use of “referenced”. What this illustrates is that
resources are often uniquely identi8able or located. Examples include addressible loca-
tions in computer memory, web addresses identiHed by URLs, and people. This calls
the assumption that ◦ be a total operation into question, and suggests a Hrst reHnement
of the basic model of resource arising from preordered monoids: in order to use ◦ to
talk about diQerent collections, it is useful for ◦ to be partial. For example, if m0 and
m1 describe sets of uniquely identiHable resources, then we can stipulate that m0◦m1 be
deHned only when the resources described are disjoint. We will see later that this kind
of partiality is useful when accounting for update, and for allocation and deallocation.
We begin our arguments, in Section 2, with a brief proof-theoretic description of
BI, including a sketch of its categorical semantics. In Section 3, we introduce three
semantics for BI: Firstly, we give an account of BI-algebras. Secondly, via a brief
diversion to give account of BI in terms of Gabbay’s notion of Hbring [18,42], we
give a Kripke forcing semantics, based on an algebra of worlds which can be directly
motivated by our basic model of resource. 1 Thirdly, we discuss BI’s partial monoid
semantics, explaining its value in resource modelling.
After presenting this material, we consider, in Section 3.5, the technical issue of
completeness. BI’s calculus forces a rather delicate treatment of inconsistency which
forces us to reHne the elementary Kripke forcing semantics to exploit technically its
inherently topological structure. SpeciHcally, we explain how the elementary version of
the forcing semantics is complete for BI without inconsistency ⊥ but incomplete when
inconsistency is added, and discuss how to recover completeness for BI with ⊥ by
moving to topological setting within which ⊥ is internalized. We conclude Section 3
with a summary of the technical properties, including completeness, of a semantics
based on partial monoids, consequences of which include the decidability and the Hnite
model property for propositional BI [19]. Note that full propositional linear logic, with
exponentials, is undecidable even when restricted to the intuitionistic fragment, that the
status of MELL is unknown, and that neither has the Hnite model property [26,29].
Note also that the relevant logic R is undecidable [45].
In Section 4, after further discussion of resource modelling, we present a number of
concrete models, which illustrate a range of features of resources, including: distribu-
tion (Petri nets, Ambients); resource allocation, deallocation and access (the separation
model); update (the pointer model); group membership (logic programming); and cost
(coins required for purchases). The richness of these models provides many challenges
for the development of a good general model of resource.
Our technical development culminates, in Section 5, with a less elementary seman-
tics. It is again based on (preordered) commutative monoids but this time topological
concepts (topological monoids and sheaves) are brought to bear in order to give a
complete account of inconsistency, i.e., BI with ⊥ and completeness. Our most so-
phisticated semantics, for which we give a detailed proof of completeness, is based
on Grothendieck sheaves on preordered monoids. We show that this semantics encom-
1 Technically, the types of models arising in the two semantics are both instances of the class of categorical
models used to interpret BI’s proofs. However, they are conceptually quite distinct. We shall return to this
point in the sequel.
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passes the “pointer logic” examples, the elementary formulation of which is based on
partial monoids.
2. A proof-theoretic perspective
In this section we recall the fundamentals of BI from the point of view of its proof-
theoretic roots Hrst discussed in [38]. In terms of provability, the description here is
equivalent to the algebraic account given in the next section; some readers may wish
to skim this section and refer back as necessary.
Linear logic [20] provides a system within which connectives deHned by multiplica-
tive and additive rules co-exist. SpeciHcally, in the intuitionistic linear setting, we get
both multiplicative conjunction, introduced by
1  ’1 2  ’2
1; 2  ’1 ⊗ ’2
and additive conjunction, introduced by
  ’1   ’2
  ’1&’2 :
However, linear logic gives no corresponding analysis of implication: Starting from its
basic multiplicative implication, (, introduced by
; ’   
  ’(  
linear logic recovers not merely additive but intuitionistic implication, →, via its modal-
ity, !: there is a translation of intuitionistic logic into intuitionistic linear logic which
renders ’ →  as (!’)(  .
However, one can ask whether it is possible to have both a multiplicative and an ad-
ditive implication co-existing without recourse to modalities. From the point of view of
natural deduction, having the two requisite elimination rules together is unproblematic:
  ’(    ’
;    ( E
  ’ →    ’
   → E:
But the co-existence of the two requisite introduction rules presents an immediate
diNculty: Given
; ’   
  ’(  ( I;
how can we distinguish → I ? A semantically clean solution (cf. an alternative, seman-
tically less desirable solution described in [51] and discussed in [42]) is to introduce
a context-forming operation “;” in addition to “,”. Then we can formulate a second
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introduction rule:
;’   
  ’ →  → I:
As a consequence we form not Hnite sequences of assumptions but rather Hnite trees,
with assumptions at the leaves and “,”s and “;”s at the internal nodes. Such a struc-
ture is called a bunch [13,38,42,43]. Bunches are given by the following
grammar:
 ::= ’|∅m|; |∅a|;;
in which ∅m and ∅a are units for “,” and “;”, respectively. We write () to denote that
 is a sub-bunch of  in the evident sense. We then take the following equivalence,
≡, on bunches:
• Commutative monoid equations for “,” and ∅m;
• Commutative monoid equations for “;” and ∅a;
• Congruence: if ≡′, then ()≡(′).
Given this structure, we can deHne BI, the logic of bunched implications [38,41,42],
as a natural deduction system, as in Table 1, in which we use −∗ , pronounced “magic
wand”, for multiplicative implication and ∗, pronounced “star”, for multiplicative con-
junction, → and ∧ for their additive counterparts, and ∨ for disjunction. The units of
∗, ∧ and ∨ are denoted I , 
 and ⊥ (inconsistency), respectively.
Notice that Weakening (W ) and Contraction (C),
()  ’
(;′)  ’ W
(;)  ’
()  ’ C;
are permitted for “;” but not for “,”. Notice also that the rules for the additives are
presented in the multiplicative style but with combination of bunches using “;”. Thus
the more familiar additive forms arise via Contraction.
The metatheory of this system is discussed in [42], where it is shown that NBI is
strongly normalizing and has the subject reduction property. BI may also be pre-
sented as Cut-free sequent calculus [42]. Note, in particular, that we have freely
combined propositional intuitionistic logic and propositional multiplicative intuitionistic
linear logic.
Corresponding to BI’s natural deduction system is a lambda calculus, . The cor-
respondence between  and BI’s natural deduction system follows the pattern for
intuitionistic logic except that we have two abstraction operations (and so two applica-
tions) corresponding to the additive (x : ’:M) and multiplicative (x : ’:M) implica-
tions. The metatheory of  is discussed in [42] and its applications to the semantics
of Idealized Algol and Syntactic Control of Interference are discussed in [36,37,38,42].
Categorically, BI’s proofs can be interpreted in doubly closed categories (DCCs)
which carry two symmetric monoidal closed structures, one of which is cartesian. This
structure provides a crisp account of the essential diQerence between BI and linear
logic: to model linear logic two closed categories are used (where one is often a Kleisli
category [4]), instead of a single category with two closed structures. See [37,38,42]
for a fuller account of the diQerences with linear logic.
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Table 1
Natural Deduction System for BI: NBI
Identity and Structure
’  ’ Axiom
  ’
  ’ ≡ (where  ≡ ) E
()  ’
(;′)  ’ W
(;)  ’
()  ’ C
Multiplicatives
∅m  I I I
(∅m)     I
()   I E
  ’    
;   ’ ∗  ∗ I
(’;  )     ’ ∗  
()   ∗E
; ’   
  ’−∗  −∗ I
  ’−∗    ’
;    −∗E
Additives
∅a    I
(∅a)     
()   E
  ’    
;  ’ ∧  ∧I
(’;  )     ’ ∧  
()   ∧E
;’   
  ’→  → I
  ’→    ’
;   → E
  ⊥
  ’ ⊥E
  ’i
  ’1 ∨ ’2
(i = 1; 2) ∨ I   ’ ∨  (’)   ( )  
()   ∨E
The two monoidal closed structures in a DCC are used to interpret the multiplicative
conjunction and implication and the additive conjunction and implication in the usual
adjoint relationship [28]:
[E ⊗ F;G] ∼= [E; F ( G] and [E × F;G] ∼= [E; F → G];
where ⊗ is a symmetric monoidal product, with corresponding internal homF ( G,
and × is cartesian product, with corresponding internal homF→G. To interpret ∨, we
must also have co-products (bi-DCCs). A DCC alone does not constitute a deHnition
of a model of BI, for which we must also have an interpretation of BI’s syntax. Such
an interpretation is a function from BI’s language of propositions to the objects of a
DCC, deHned by induction on the structure of propositions.
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The interpretation of BI in a bi-cartesian DCC, with the two closed structures
(×; 1;→) and (⊗; I;() and co-product (+; 0), is given by a function < − = such that:
<’ ∨  = = <’= + < =;
<⊥= = 0;
<’ ∧  = = <’= × < =;
<
= = 1;
<’ →  = = < = → <’=;
<’ ∗  = = <’= ⊗ < =;
<I = = I
<’−∗  = = < =(<’=:
We interpret a bunch  by replacing each “,” with ∗ and each “;” with ∧. We write
< − =D when we want to indicate that the interpretation is in the (bi-C)DCC D.
Soundness and completeness results for the interpretation of BI’s proofs in DCCs
are given in [42].
Examples of DCCs are discussed in [38,42], including Set×Set, in which the tensor
product and function space are given by
I = (1; 0);
(E0; E1)⊗ (F0; F1) = ((E0 × F0) + (E1 × F1) ; (E0 × F1) + (E1 × F0));
(E0; E1)( (F0; F1) = ((E0 → F0)× (E1 → F1) ; (E0 → F1)× (E1 → F0)):
This model can also be used to show that BI’s treatment of intuitionistic implication
is quite diQerent from linear logic’s. SpeciHcally, we can see that there is no functor
! : Set × Set → Set × Set
such that !E ( F ∼= E → F : we have that (1; 0)→ (2; 2)= (2; 1) but, for any E, E (
(2; 2)= (X; Y ), for sets X and Y of the same cardinality. Thus, in general, there is no
way to interpret linear logic’s modality !, with the property that ’ →   (!’)(  ,
as an endofunctor on models of BI.
A general construction of DCCs is given by Day’s tensor product [11]. Given a small
(symmetric) monoidal category (C; ◦; I), there is a (symmetric) monoidal structure on
the category [Cop;Set], deHned as follows: The unit I of the monoidal structure is
C[−; I ]. Given functors E and F , the formula for the tensor product is written using
co-ends:
(E ⊗ F)X =
∫ Y;Y ′
EY × FY ′ × C[X; Y ⊗ Y ′]:
The formula for ( uses an end:
(E ( F)X =
∫
Y
Set[EY; F(X ⊗ Y )] ∼= SetCop [E(−); F(X ⊗−)]:
The formulV for (E ⊗ F)X and (E ( F)X are both contravariant in Z , giving the
morphism parts of the functors.
This construction also provides the basic categorical framework within which we
can formulate the theory of Kripke models for BI [38,42], wherein the semantics of
proofs is also developed. We return this point in Section 5.
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3. A semantic perspective
We begin our semantic development, in Section 3.1, with a basic algebraic seman-
tics of BI, together with BI’s associated Hilbert-type proof system, based directly on
preordered commutative monoids. The Hilbert-type calculus, which we show to be
equivalent to NBI, will provide a convenient basis, in Section 5.3, for proving our
most general completeness theorem. In Section 3.2, we introduce BI’s elementary pos-
sible worlds semantics and, in Section 3.3, pause to relate BI to Gabbay’s Hbring of
logics [18]. We proceed, in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, to discuss soundness, completeness
and incompleteness results for BI’s elementary possible worlds semantics.
3.1. An algebraic semantics and a calculus
For the remainder of the paper, we shall be concerned primarily with truth and
provability, rather than the structure of proofs. For technical simplicity, therefore, we
present a simple algebraic semantics and a simple associated Hilbert-type calculus for
BI [42]. This presentation of BI does not make use of bunches, i.e., BI’s tree-structured
contexts, described in Section 2.
In order to motivate the algebraic semantics, it is useful to recall brieJy BI’s cate-
gorical interpretation, sketched in Section 2: The main point is that we have a single
category with two adjunctions,
[A ∗ B; C] ∼= [A; B−∗C] and [A ∧ B; C] ∼= [A; B → C];
that characterize the two implications. The algebraic models we will present are col-
lapsed versions of these categorical structures, where the additive implication → cor-
responds to intuitionistic logic and the multiplicative −∗ to a basic substructural logic.
To describe the models, Hrst recall that Heyting algebras are the algebraic models
of intuitionistic propositional logic. A Heyting algebra is a lattice with greatest and
least elements in which the meet a ∧ b is residuated, which is to say that there is an
implication operator, →, satisfying
a ∧ b6 c iQ a6 b → c:
An algebraic model of a basic substructural logic containing conjunction ∗, unit I and
implication −∗ is similar, except that ∗ is not required to be meet, and I is not required
to be top. That is, we would require a partial order with a (monotone) commutative
monoid structure that is residuated, so that
a ∗ b6 c iQ a6 b−∗ c:
Because we have all of the connectives of intuitionistic logic and the basic substructural
logic at the same time, we simply ask for a single algebra that has both kinds of
structure:
A BI-algebra is a Heyting algebra equipped with an additional residuated com-
mutative monoid structure.
Note that the same underlying order is used to describe the residuated structure in
both cases; this corresponds to the DCC structure in categorical semantics. Having
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Table 2
Hilbert-type System for BI: HBI
’  ’
’   ⊥  ’
"  ’ "   
"  ’ ∧  
’   1 ∧  2
’   i
(i = 1; 2)
"   ’   
" ∨ ’   
’   i
’   1 ∨  2
(i = 1; 2)
 ∧ ’   
  ’→  
  ’→  "  ’
 ∧ "   
’ ∗ ( ∗ ) (’ ∗  ) ∗  ’ ∗ I ’ I ∗ ’
  ’ "   
 ∗ "  ’ ∗  ’ ∗    ∗ ’
 ∗ ’   
  ’−∗  
  ’−∗  "  ’
 ∗ "   
two residuated structures for one preorder is intimately related to the possibility of
having a possible worlds semantics that directly combines the monoidal semantics of
substructural logics and (Kripke or Grothendieck) semantics of intuitionistic logic.
From this notion of BI-algebra, it is straightforward to derive a collection of axioms
and rules for proving judgements ’   , where the formulV ’ and  are built from
propositional variables, the additive connectives →, ∧, 
, ∨ and ⊥, and the multi-
plicative connectives I , ∗ and −∗ . The axioms and rules of this Hilbert-type system,
HBI, given in Table 2, are those for a presentation of intuitionistic propositional logic
together with the rules for the substructural fragment. This way of formulating the
system is proof-theoretically unsophisticated but it is adequate for capturing provabil-
ity and admits straightforward soundness and, in particular, completeness proofs with
respect to both the BI-algebras introduced in this section and the Grothendieck topo-
logical models discussed in Section 5.3. Obviously, by induction on the structure of
proofs in HBI and NBI, we have the following:
Lemma 1 (equivalence of NBI and HBI). ’   is provable in HBI iQ ’   is
provable in NBI.
The reader will recognize in HBI laws for coproducts, products, tensor products, and
implicational adjunctions. We say that “  ’ is provable” to indicate that   ’ can
be proven using this system. This structure also explains how to give the appropriate
notion of interpretation of BI’s formulV in BI-algebras, so that can state the expected
soundness and completeness properties. Let A be BI-algeba. We write <’=A6< =A if
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the interpretation of ’ in A is below the interpretation of  in A. If <’=A6< =A for
all interpretations in all BI-algebras, then we write <’=6< =.
Theorem 2 (Soundness). If ’   is provable in HBI, then <’=6< =.
Proof (Sketch). By induction on the structure of proofs in HBI.
By constructing a term BI-algebra, we get completeness for HBI and BI-algebras.
Lemma 3 (Model existence). There is a BI-algebra T and an interpretation < − =T
such that if ’   is not provable in HBI, then <’=T 6 < =T.
Proof (Sketch). The Heyting part of the algebra is constructed in the usual way [53].
The remaining key components are deHned as follows:
• Elements of the algebra are equivalence classes of propositions [’] given by inter-
derivability;
• [’]6[ ] iQ ’   ;
• [’] ∗ [ ] = [’ ∗  ];
• I = [I ];
• [’−∗  ] = [’]−∗ [ ].
The result follows.
Theorem 4 (Completeness). If <’=6< =, then ’   is provable in HBI.
Proof. By the contrapositive. Suppose that ’   , then, by Lemma 3, we get
<’= 6 < =.
We will give several models in which the additives are treated classically. So we
deHne “Boolean BI” to be the consequence relation generated by the rules of HBI,
plus reductio ad absurdum:
  (’ → ⊥)→ ⊥
  ’ RAA:
An algebra model for this system is a Boolean BI-algebra, a BI-algebra in which
the Heyting (additive) component is, in fact, Boolean.
Whilst the notion of BI-algebra is useful as a reference point, the deHnition itself
does not suggest directly a declarative way of reading formulV; neither does it tell us
if there are any interesting BI-algebras. Possible worlds models, with respect to which
we may give a forcing semantics, address both of these points.
3.2. Forcing semantics
In this section, we consider BI from the perspective of truth-conditional semantics.
The basic idea is to adapt the intuitionistic idea of the creative subject exploring a
collection of preordered states of knowledge, or worlds, to a setting in which the
collection of worlds carries the structure of a model of resource.
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Following from the Introduction, we take the collection of worlds to be given by a
preordered (commutative) monoid,
M = (M; ◦; e;);
where M is a set of resources, ◦ is a (commutative) monoidal combination, with unit
e, and  is a pre-order on M subject to the bifunctoriality, or monotonicity, condition
that if m1m2 and n1 n2, then m1 ◦ n1m2 ◦ n2. Such a structure may be seen as
modifying the intuitionistic structure by introducing a decomposition of worlds, given
by ◦. Starting from this structure, we give the following:
• A basic forcing semantics for BI without ⊥, based on a satisfaction relation of the
form
m |= ’;
where m ∈ M and ’ is BI formula, including appropriate soundness and complete-
ness theorems,
• Incompleteness of the basic semantics in the presence of ⊥.
• A partial monoid semantics, suggesting a diQerent class of models, well-motivated by
resource semantics, for which a completeness theorem is obtainable (though beyond
the scope of this article) [19].
We will indicate, without going into too much technical detail, how the forcing se-
mantics, at least in the absence of inconsistency, may be seen as a restriction of the
semantics of BI’s proofs in DCCs.
Before we proceed to develop BI’s forcing semantics with respect to preordered
monoids of worlds, we make a brief technical detour.
3.3. BI via 8bring
It is possible, following Gabbay’s Preface to [42], to understand BI in terms of
Gabbay’s notion of 8bring logics [18]. Let L1 and L2 be two logics with implication
⇒1 and ⇒2. Assume these logics are characterized by semantics and models of the
form
M1 = (S1;A1; a1; h1) and M2 = (S2;A2; a2; h2);
where Si is a set of possible worlds, ai ∈ Si; hi is the assignment to the atoms and Ai is
a family of relations and/or functions used to deHne, recursively, the truth table for the
connectives of Li. Combining the two languages allows the formation of the language
[L1;L2], in which formulV may be formed by freely using connectives from both
L1 and L2.
There are various ways of providing semantics for the combined language but a
simple and transparent methodology is that of dovetailing. The semantics for dovetailing
has the form (S;A1;A2; a; h), obtained by putting both semantical conditions A1 and
A2 side-by-side and joining the requirements on h of both logics. This methodology is
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quite uniform: The combination of logics is done methodologically, not logic-by-logic,
so that for given components, their composite is determined.
Consider ’=(p ⇒1 (q ⇒2 p)). From the point of view of language L1; ’ has the
form p⇒1 X , where X is atomic. L1 does not recognize X =(q ⇒2 p), because ⇒2
is not in the language. Let M1 = (S1;A1; a1; h1) be a model of L1 and start evaluating
t 1 A, for t ∈ S1. In the inductive course of evaluation of ⇒1, we will have occasion
to evaluate s  X for some points s ∈ S1 appropriately related to t via the relations
and functions of A1. If X were a real atom of L1, then the assignment h1 would
have given us the value but X =(q ⇒2 p) is not a real atom. So how can we get
a value for s 1 X ? The answer is that we 8bre a (possibly set of) model(s) of
the language L2, with each point s ∈ S1. Let F1;2 be the Hbring function and write
F1;2(s)=Ms2 = (Ss2;As2; as2; hs2) and let
s 1 X iQ as2 2 X (in M
s
2):
The model Ms2 knows how to give a value to X .
The above is 8bred semantics for the combined language. The function F1;2 assigning
to each s a model Ms2 is a 8bring function. Of course, we also need an F2;1 for
passage from L2 models to L1 models. Dovetailing amounts to insisting that s= as2.
A straightforward calculation (see [17] for the ideas) shows that we can take models
of the form (S;A1;A2; a; h) and evaluate Li connectives using Ai, respectively.
If we perform dovetailing on intuitionistic → with the Kripke semantics (S;; h)
and on substructural −∗ with the monoid semantics (S; ◦; e; h), then we automatically
get an algebra of worlds of the form (S;; ◦; e; h) satisfying the following condition
below:
x  x′ and y  y′ imply x ◦ y  x′ ◦ y′:
This is our bifunctoriality condition, which may be seen arising from the persistence,
or resource-preserving property, of the intuitionistic connectives.
3.4. Basic forcing semantics and soundness
The semantics is stated in terms of a judgement form m |=’, which says that formula
’ is true at, or with respect to, a world m.
As we have seen, we start with a preordered commutative monoid of worlds, M=
(M; ◦; e;), for which we have the bifunctoriality condition and for which equality
in the monoid (up to which the monoid laws hold) is that which is given by the
equivalence relation ∩. Given such a monoid, semantic clauses can be given for
a form of truth, conjunction and implication as follows:
m |= I iQ m  e;
m |= ’ ∗  iQ ∃n; n′ ∈ M (m  n ◦ n′ and n |= ’ and n′ |=  );
m |= ’−∗  iQ ∀n ∈ M (n |= ’ implies n ◦ m |=  ):
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Now, the conjunction thus obtained does not admit Weakening or Contraction generally,
in that the implications
• if m |=’ ∗  , then m |=’, and
• if m |=’, then m |=’ ∗ ’
do not necessarily hold. However, it does have the implicational adjunction
• m |=(’ ∗  )−∗  iQ m |=’−∗ ( −∗ ).
Variations on this semantics have been taken as the basis for a number of notions of
model for substructural logics (e.g. [20,52]).
Of course, a substructural logic with only these three connectives is very weak and
the way in which other connectives are added is one place where signiHcant divergence
occurs. However, a simple point is central: there is already enough structure to interpret
all of the connectives of intuitionistic logic, in the style of possible worlds semantics,
without adding anything to the basic set-up:
m |= ’ ∧  iQ m |= ’ and m |=  ;
m |= ’ ∨  iQ m |= ’ or m |=  ;
m |= ’ →  iQ ∀n  m: n |= ’ implies n |=  :
We must also handle the units of ∧ and ∨, 
 and ⊥, respectively:
m |= 
 always;
m |= ⊥ never:
While the clause for 
 is straightforward, we shall see later that for ⊥ is somewhat
problematic.
All propositions are required to satisfy
Kripke Monotonicity (K): m |=’ and nm implies n |=’.
Given these deHnitions, together with an assignment Atoms(m) of the atomic propo-
sitions which are true at each world m, so that
m |= p iQ p ∈ Atoms(m);
we can deHne a semantic notion of logical consequence. This semantics can be for-
mulated in the category [Mop;Set] of presheaves over the evident preorder category
Mop.
Let M=(M; ◦; e;) be a preordered commutative monoid. We write m |=M  just
in case m |=M ’, where ’ is the formula obtained from  by replacing each “,” by
∗ and each “;” by ∧. We then write  |=M ’ just in case, for all m in M , if m |=M ,
then m |=M ’. Finally, we write  |=’ just in case, for all M,  |=M ’.
Lemma 5 (Soundness). If   ’, then  |=’.
Proof. A straightforward induction on the structure of proofs [42].
Soundness can also be stated in algebraic terms, by saying that the collection of
downwards-closed subsets of a preordered commutative monoid forms a BI-algebra.
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The semantic clauses just given specify the algebra structure. Note that there is nothing
essential about intuitionistic logic here. In the special case in which the preorder is an
equivalence relation, the semantics will validate the law of the excluded middle, so
we get a Boolean BI-algebra (in this case, the semantic clauses for additives reduce
to those of a semantics of classical logic in a powerset).
The possible worlds semantics gives a large number of models of BI, for the simple
reason that there are so very many (preordered) commutative monoids. This brings up a
curious historical fact. In many presentations of systems of substructural logic—see, for
example, [45]—this (or a similar) semantics is altered, typically by imposing additional
conditions, with the eQect of precluding the existence of the additive implication →
(be it intuitionistic or classical). The reason, so it seems [12], is that if one omits
Weakening from standard sequent calculus then the law
’ ∧ ( ∨ ()  (’ ∨  ) ∧ (’ ∨ ();
of distribution, is lost (distribution is a consequence of having a full strength intuition-
istic →).
However, this choice seems curious: a simple semantics is altered to match a some-
what singular choice in the proof theory. The result is a logic in which it is very
diNcult to read the additive connectives in a simple way—where ∧ means “and” and
∨ means “or”: these lead to distribution.
Independently of these general arguments, we stress a practical point: to deny →
is to deny access to the structure of a host of simple, naturally occurring, models. Of
course, if none of these models were interesting the price would not be so great; this
brings us back to our motivation in resource modelling and so to what we therefore
call the resource interpretation of the connectives. In the resource interpretation we
think of a formula as making a declarative statement about some state-of-aQairs but
the truth of it is to be judged relative to access to available resources. Consider ’ ∗  .
We read it informally as follows:
’ ∗  is true just if the current resource can be decomposed into constituents in
such a way as to make ’ true of one constituent and  true of the other.
Similarly, we read ’−∗  as follows:
’−∗  is true just if, whenever we are given resources that make ’ true, combining
with what we already have,  will then also be made true.
This kind of reading also works for the additive connnectives; for example:
’→  is true just if any consistent resource that makes ’ true also makes  true.
That the resource interpretation works for the full-strength additive implication, as well
as conjunction and disjunction, is signiHcant, since it is the extension of a reading of
multiplicatives to other connectives that is often problematic in substructural logics.
A very simple model, which is obtained by taking worlds as natural numbers, where
 is the usual less than (reversed), ◦ is addition and e is ⊥, may readily be seen
to support these intuitions (to which we return in Section 4.6). 2 We emphasize that
neither our monoidal model of resource nor the corresponding resource interepretation
of the connectives is forced by our semantics. Rather, they merely are supported by it.
2 Note that this is an aNne model: Weakening, ’ ∗  |=’, is admissible and I =.
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We conclude by remarking that an alternative presentation of the semantics of sub-
structural connectives is both possible and commonplace in relevant logic [13]. BrieJy,
our use of a monoidal product ◦ together with an order  may be replaced by a ternary
relation R on a set of worlds, so that, for example, the forcing relation for −∗ is ren-
dered as
l |= ’−∗  iQ for all m; n ∈ M such that R(l; m; n); if m |= ’; then n |=  :
3.5. Completeness and incompleteness
The monoid semantics gives us a way to construct BI-algebras but the algebras ob-
tained are very special. Although it gives a limited class of models, Kripke’s semantics
is still complete for intuitionistic logic. So it is natural to ask: what is the status of
the elementary monoid models with respect to BI?
The key issue is the handling of inconsistency in the presence of multiplicative
connectives. The propositions p and p−∗ ⊥ are both consistent yet the proposition
p ∗ (p−∗ ⊥) is inconsistent since
p ∗ (p−∗⊥)  ⊥:
This is not a problem in and of itself, but the fact that ∗ does not preserve consistency,
together with the treatment of ⊥ in the elementary semantics, leads to incompleteness.
Proposition 6 (Elementary incompleteness). (p−∗ ⊥)→⊥∧ (q−∗ ⊥)→⊥|=(p ∗ q−∗
⊥)→⊥ in the elementary monoid semantics but (p−∗ ⊥)→⊥∧ (q−∗ ⊥)→⊥  (p ∗
q−∗ ⊥)→⊥ in BI’s calculus.
Proof. The key to showing incompleteness is that the formula (’−∗ ⊥)→⊥ expresses
consistency of ’ in the monoid semantics, in the following sense:
m |= (’−∗⊥)→ ⊥ holds iQ there is an n such that n |= ’:
Now, we can use the totality of the monoid operation against itself.
To see why the semantic judgement in the proposition is true, given n where n |=p
and m where m |=q, we have that n ◦m |=p ∗ q and, because of the existential formula
characterizing (p−∗⊥)→⊥, this is enough to give us the judgement.
The unprovability of the syntactic judgement is easy to establish via the cut-elimi-
nation theorem for BI’s sequent calculus [41,42]. (Also, at the end of Section 5.3, we
give an explicit counter-model.)
A more conceptual, partial explanation of this incompleteness can be seen by con-
sidering where a standard completeness argument breaks down. In this (which is es-
sentially a Yoneda lemma argument), we use the propositions of BI to build a term
model. Formally, the term monoid has the set of formulV as its underlying set and the
order and monoid structure are given by
• ’  iQ ’  ,
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• ’ ◦  =’ ∗  and
• e= I .
Then the main subsidiary lemma is
’  is provable iQ ’ |=  in the term model.
This lemma is established by a routine induction on  , but there is a sticking point:
the proof breaks down when we encounter ∨ or ⊥. For example, from ’  0∨ 1 it does
not follow that ’  0 or ’  1, as would be needed for the result: take ’=  0 ∨  1.
Similarly, the monoid semantics would require that ’⊥ never holds: but this is not
the case when ’=⊥.
However, the proof based on the Yoneda lemma does go through for the (⊥;∨)-free
fragment, so we may conclude the following:
Proposition 7 (Completeness for (⊥;∨)-free fragment). If ’ and  are (⊥;∨)-free
formul< then ’  is provable i= ’ |=  in all monoid models.
The absence of ∨ is not important, however. The failure of the argument of ∨ rep-
resents a failure of the easy proof, based on the Yoneda lemma, rather than the failure
of completeness. In [42], it is shown that this elementary result can be extended to the
⊥-free fragment, using an argument (beyond our present scope, but see Section 5.2)
based on the construction of prime bunches. Proposition 6 shows that the restriction
on ⊥ cannot be removed.
We emphasize also that the incompleteness of the elementary monoid semantics
arises from the interaction between the two implications and inconsistency, ⊥.
So, what are we to make of our completeness and incompleteness results so far? The
answer lies in the internalization of inconsistency by the semantics. Consider that the
(complete) algebraic models in Section 3.1 or, more generally, the categorical seman-
tics of proofs in [38,42] include representatives for inconsistency (the initial object, 0,
which interprets ⊥). The elementary forcing semantics, in contrast, can handle incon-
sistency only by denying the existence of a world at which ⊥ is forced. Completeness
for a monoid-based forcing semantics can be achieved in settings in which internal
representives for inconsistency are available. We develop such a semantics [42] in
Sections 5 and 5.3.
3.6. Partial monoids of resources-as-worlds
We have seen how a basic model of resource corresponds to the algebra worlds
required for BI’s possible worlds semantics. We have explained some of the theory
but also described a technical problem: the treatment of ⊥ in the elementary semantics
yields an incompleteness. We have discussed internalizing ⊥ and we present the details
of this solution [42] in Section 5.3. In terms of resources, a way to see the problem
is to trace it to the assumption that the combining operation ◦ is always deHned; but
why, in terms of resources, should it be?
In many situations resources are considered as located, or uniquely identiHable.
Examples include addressible memory locations in computer memory, web addresses
identiHed by URLs, and people. In such cases, in order to use ∗ to talk about
D.J. Pym et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 315 (2004) 257–305 273
diQerent collections, it is useful for ◦ to be partial. For example, if m and n describe
sets of uniquely identiHable resources, then we can stipulate that m ◦ n is deHned only
when the resources described are disjoint. Then, in a forumula ’∗  the conjuncts will
talk about disjoint collections of the uniquely identiHed resources. We shall see later
that this kind of partiality is useful when accounting for update, and for allocation and
deallocation.
Mathematically, we give a semantics based on (commutative) preordered monoids,
M=(M; ◦; e;), in which ◦ :M ×M *M is a partial function (satisfying the evident
monotonicity conditions). The key cases in the forcing semantics based on partial
monoids are, of course, for ⊥ and for the multiplicatives:
m |= ⊥ iQ never;
m |= ’ ∗  iQ there exist n; n′ such that (n ◦ n′) ↓;
m  n ◦ n′; and n |= ’ and n′ |=  ;
m |= ’−∗  iQ for all n such that n |= ’; if (m ◦ n) ↓; then m ◦ n |=  ;
where ↓ denotes deHnedness. The utility of such semantics is illustrated in the next
section, in which we develop concrete computational models based directly upon it.
The soundness and completeness of the partial monoid semantics for BI with ⊥
was is shown in [19]. The methods of [19] go well beyond the scope of this paper
but build on it by using the Grothendieck topological models that we introduce in
Section 5.3 to formulate the system of semantic tableaux. The analysis in [19] utilizes
labelled semantic tableaux, with the algebra of labels being given by the worlds of a
Grothendieck topology, q.v. Section 4.3, and yields several strong logical results for
propositional BI, including decidability and the Hnite model property.
4. Computational models
So far we have provided a conceptual discussion of the notion of resource as a basis
for BI’s model theory and developed the basic meta-theory of an elementary forcing
semantics.
In this section, we consider BI’s use as a basis for a range of models in which the
notion of resource is concrete:
• Petri nets: classical true concurrency [15];
• Ambient logic: mobile processes [8];
• Memory allocation and deallocation: a basic separation model [22,46];
• Pointer logic: program logic for mutable data structures [22];
• Logic programming: sharing and group membership [2,3];
• Money: an example of cost.
These models give concrete examples of the resource interpretation of BI-algebras and
BI’s forcing semantics.
Resource, however, is a multi-faceted notion, with aspects such as location, own-
ership, protection, and competition for resources. These concepts are reJected, either
explicitly or implicitly, in some of the speciHc models which follow in this section but
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are not part of the mathematical axiomatization of resource that we have so far devel-
oped. To obtain a richer theory would require a thorough treatment of the dynamics
of processes. We emphasize, however, that it is not dynamics alone, with (say) asso-
ciated modalities, that is at issue: rather the question concerns the interaction between
dynamics and resource.
So before considering these concrete examples, it is worth pausing to ask whether
it is possible to add structure to our resource semantics, corresponding to ideas such
as sharing or ownership, or to add axioms which would exclude examples that are not
“resource-like”. These questions are the subject of current research but we conjecture
that an appropriate logical setting is given by a forcing relation of the form
m | P |= ’;
in which we intend that m denotes an element of resource, perhaps drawn from a
monoidal structure of this kind we have discussed, P denotes a process term located
at a resource m, and ’ denotes a propositional assertion in a logic based on BI. The
whole judgement, m |P |=’, is then read as “the propositional assertion ’ is true of
process P located at resource m”. This gives us a direct way to approach the concept
of distributed resources.
Given a framework along these lines, we can see how it is possible to deHne modal-
ities which describe the interaction between resources and processes. There are many
choices available in their deHnition, but two general classes may readily be identiHed. 3
Firstly, “temporal” polymodal necessity and possibility, which require no evolution of
the resource component and which provide a basis for the modalities occurring in the
examples of this section:
m | P |= [t]’ iQ for every Q; if (m; P) t→(m;Q) is an evolution located
at m; then m | Q |= ’;
m | P |= 〈t〉’ iQ for some Q; (m; P) t→(m;Q) is an evolution located
at m; and m | Q |= ’:
Here, an evolution t, such as an action in a process algebra but whose internal structure
is not considered here, is a map between pairs of resources (worlds) and propositions.
These judgements indicate how to generalize process logics such as that presented in
[34] to include explicit resource components.
Secondly, we may also introduce “spatial” modalities, which do require an evolution
of the resource components of their deHning judgements and whose relationship with
the temporal modalities is analogous to that between −∗ and → (or, more closely,
3 Here we assume we are starting from Boolean BI, i.e., with classical additives, so that we may use
the ordering, , in a preordered monoid to interpret the temporal modalities. (Of course, the use of simple
ordering is itself a simpliHed treatment of the more general relational notion of modality.) It is possible to
take intuitionistic additives, but since they must exploit the ordering  for their deHnition, we must impose,
using the techniques discussed in [49], additional relational structure to give meaning to the modalities.
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that between the additive quantiHers (∀ and ∃) and their mutliplicative counterparts
(∀new and ∃new) [38,41,42]). Here, the intuition is that the resource required for an
evolution may be located separately from the data which will evolve. For example, we
might deHne a spatial necessity as
m | P |= [t]new’ iQ for every n and Q; if (m; P) t→(m ◦ n; Q) is an
evolution located at n; then m ◦ n | Q |= ’:
The detailed technical development of these ideas is beyond our present scope. For
now, we content ourselves with the examples which follow.
4.1. Petri nets
Petri nets provide a basic, concrete, model of computation, which Hts well with the
resource interpretation of BI’s semantics. A central tenet of net theory is that resource
is distributed throughout a net, in the form of tokens that reside in places. A distribution
of tokens is called a marking; a net evolves according to local rules which show how
to go from one marking to another. As in [15], we consider a basic notion of net
which does not have capacities.
Formally, a net N=(P; T; pre; post) consists of sets P and T of places and tran-
sitions and two functions pre; post : T →M, from transitions to markings, where a
marking is a Hnite multiset of places andM denotes the set of all markings. A marking
may be regarded as a function M :P→N from places to natural numbers that is zero
on all but Hnitely many places. Addition of markings is given by (M+N )p=Mp+Np.
We let [−] denote the empty marking.
There are several ways that nets can be used to provide a model of BI. One way
internalizes the reachability relation on markings, by conJating it with the intuitionistic
ordering in the model. If M and N are markings, then deHne
M ⇒ N iQ there are t; M ′ such that M = pre(t) +M ′ and N = post(t) +M ′:
We can then deHne a preorder on markings by
M  N iQ there are M1; : : : ; Mn such that M = M1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Mn = N:
Then (M; [−];+;) is a preordered commutative monoid and so this gives us an
interpretation of all the connectives.
Now, this model is just the Petri net semantics of linear logic described by Engberg
and Winskel [15], except that they did not include →. This omission seems strange
in retrospect, given that it exists naturally in the model. Admitting it enables some of
the discrepancies between model and logic observed by Engberg and Winskel to be
avoided. These include the need to state an axiom for distribution of ∨ over ∧, which
is implied by the more primitive rules for →, as well as the ability to state negative
properties of nets using ¬’=’→⊥.
A basic example is mutual exclusion, where we say that two places cannot be marked
at the same time. To see how this works, consider the following net, which represents
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processes either producing an item to a buQer or consuming an item from the buQer:
b tr
r and t denote ready processes and terminated processes, respectively and b represents
a buQer whose tokens are items produced. Then we can say that a process is not both
ready and terminated using ¬ (r ∗ t ∗ 
). Using −∗ , we can further say that a process
is not both ready and terminated in any marking reachable from a given marking
M0 :M0−∗ ¬ (r ∗ t ∗ 
). Note the roˆle of 
 in r ∗ t ∗ 
. It enables the state, at a given
time, to be partitioned into three parts where r is true in one, t in another, and where
the third part is arbitrary.
There are two other natural models of BI using Petri nets. One interprets the 
relation on markings not as reachability, but as multiset inclusion. The other interprets
 as equality, and is thus a model of Boolean BI.
However, if we were to detach  from reachability, we would have to have some
other way of accounting for net dynamics. We could certainly do this by using modal-
ities for transitions (e.g., [44]), but a detailed development is beyond the scope of
this paper. The main question is whether a logic of nets could be obtained that com-
bines a convincing account of multiplicities, as in Engberg and Winskel’s work, with
a straightforward account of dynamics as in temporal logics.
4.2. Ambient logic
In [8], Cardelli and Gordon introduced a logic, the “ambient logic”, for describing
properties of their calculus of mobile ambients. Here we relate ambient logic to BI’s
resource semantics.
At the core of ambient logic is a notion of a labelled tree. This is described with a
process calculus-style notation, as follows:
P;Q ::= 0 | P|Q | a[P]:
The notation a[P] is for an edge labelled a, atop tree P. These terms come with
an equivalence relation ≡, which is the least congruence (with respect to | and a[−])
making (0; |) a total commutative monoid. This monoid thus gives us a possible worlds
model of Boolean BI.
The ambient logic has a modality, the “ambient match” a[’], for dealing with the
labelled part a[P] in the grammar of tree-terms.
P |= a[’] iQ ∃Q:P ≡ a[Q] and Q |= ’:
For an example of the interaction of ∗ and match, a[b[
]] ∗ a[¬ b[
]] says that there
is a path in the tree consisting of an a followed by a b and another path starting with
an a which has no b as a successor.
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In the original ambient logic, the trees were combined also with process calculus
terms. This is just as in Mads Dam’s thesis [10], except that ambient logic has the full
strength additives of classical logic, rather than the weaker additives of linear logic
(which deny classically-valid properties such as distribution of ∨ over ∧) that Dam
was concerned to model. In fact, for essentially any process calculus one immediately
gets a model of Boolean BI just by observing that parallel composition is part of a
commutative monoid, which gives the semantics of multiplicatives, and by interpreting
additives using the boolean algebra structure of a powerset.
In this speciHc case of ambient logic, however, the interplay between ∗, ambient
match, and temporal modalities allows for compact and intuitive speciHcations of prop-
erties about process mobility. For instance, “eventually the agent crosses the Hrewall”
might be (at least partially) rendered as
agent[
] ∗ 8rewall[
]⇒ 8rewall[agent[
] ∗ 
]:
Similar, that the agent never enters the Hrewall might be
agent[
] ∗ 8rewall[
]⇒ ¬(
 ∗ 8rewall[agent[
] ∗ 
]):
Ultimately, the novelty of ambient logic lies in the interaction between location
(n[−]) and parallelism (rather than only ∗ as |). In fact, it is not at this time clear if a
substructural logic for, say, CCS or 2-calculus, with ∗ interpreted directly as |, would
be a useful logic of processes.
An odd property of ambient trees is worth mentioning: it is possible to have several
paths with the same labels. For instance, a[b[0]] | a[b[0]] is a tree with two paths
labelled ab, and this tree is distinct from a[b[0]]. This feature is motivated by the
design of the ambient calculus.
In any case, the ambient logic and its descendents (e.g., [6,7]) give a collection
of naturally occurring examples of the possible world models: Mathematically, all the
descendents of ambient logic are based on speciHc models of the total monoid semantics
of BI (advanced by the Hrst author in 1997 and presented in [38,42]), along with
additional connectives or atomic formulV. In particular, ambient logic illustrates our
basic point, of the desirability of having full-strength additives alongside multiplicative
connectives (consider the use of classical negation in the statement that the agent does
not cross the Hrewall). Cardelli and Gordon came to this conclusion about additives
independently, which perhaps underlines the naturality of the simple way of combining
multiplicatives with full-strength additives, taken by ambient logic and BI.
4.3. Resource allocation and deallocation: the basic separation model
The models discussed so far in this section are all based on total monoids: given
worlds m and n we can always form their combination m ◦ n. However, we have
mentioned that BI may also be given a semantics based on partial monoids. Here
we provide an example which directly makes use of this semantics. We also show,
in Section 5.4, that this example may be couched in terms of our most general total
semantics.
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Suppose we are given an inHnite set Res= {r0; r1; : : :}. We think of the elements of
Res as primitive resources, or resource IDs, that can be allocated and deallocated. The
partial monoid structure is given by taking a world to be a Hnite subset of Res, and ◦
to be union of disjoint sets. In more detail, where ↑ denotes undeHnedness,
m ◦ n =
{
m ∪ n if m ∩ n = ∅;
↑ otherwise:
The unit of ◦ is the empty set. By taking  to be equality we get a model of Boolean
BI. (An intuitionistic model is obtained by taking  to be inclusion.) With this model,
if ’ ∗  holds for a given collection of resources then ’ and  hold for disjoint sub-
collections. This is an example of what John Reynolds refers to as resource separation
[47].
Separation gives us a way to talk about allocation and deallocation of resources. To
describe this we consider a simple model where a system state is a pair s; m, where
s :Var→Res is a function mapping variables (x; y; : : :) to IDs and m is a Hnite set of
IDs (thought of as the set of currently active, or allocated, IDs). We consider three
actions for altering the state. In the following, x and y are variables:
• x :=y is the usual assignment command;
• new(x) generates a new resource ID and binds it to x;
• dispose(x) deallocates the ID bound to x.
In order to describe atomic propositions, we parametrize |= with the s component,
writing m |=s ’. We are technically remaining in a propositional set-up, but this ob-
viously paves the way to a consideration of quantiHers. The basic proposition is the
activity assertion act(x), which says that the ID denoted by x is in the state:
m |=s act(x) iQ {sx} = m:
Notice that the semantics of act is “exact”, in that x must describe the only ID in m.
We can describe a “loose” variant using act(x) ∗ 
.
Here is a Hoare logic axiom for allocation [46]:
{’}new(x){’ ∗ act(x)};
where x is not free in ’. To understand this axiom, suppose ’ holds of an “active set”
n before new(x) is executed. Then new will select some ID r not in n, bind it to x,
and add r to the active set. In the resulting active set n∪{r} the formula ’ ∗ act(x)
will hold, because act(x) will hold in r (with the binding sx= r) while ’ will remain
true of n.
Here is the axiom for disposal [22]:
{’ ∗ act(x)}dispose(x){’}:
In words, if x is active, and ’ holds for all the allocated resource IDs other than x, then
’ will hold for the entire active set after x’s ID is removed. (The exact interpretation
of act is important for this axiom.)
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Notice that there is no “unique reference” property (where only one copy of an
ID is present) implicit in the axiom for disposal. The unique reference property is
often suggested as being important for ensuring that a disposed reference will not be
subsequently used. In fact, however, there are many situations where such a prop-
erty is impractical to expect, such as when working with doubly-linked lists or graph
structures.
To describe a simple example violating “unique reference” we use an equality pred-
icate x=y, which holds just if x and y denote the same ID in s:
m |=s x = y iQ sx = sy:
Then
{(x = y) ∗ act(x)}dispose(x){x = y}
is an instance of the dispose axiom. Here, x and y are aliases (diQerent names for the
same ID), but disposal can still be reasoned about. The essential point is that the post-
condition does not have act(y) or act(x). This precludes reasoning about subsequent
attempts to dispose x or y (which are in fact the same in the postcondition), because
the axiom for disposal requires an activity assertion in its precondition.
Aliases of this form can be introduced by assignment. For instance, using the usual
Hoare axioms for assignment and sequencing, we could infer
{act(y)}x := y; dispose(x){x = y}:
This use of ∗ to account for disposal in a way that is compatible with aliasing is
reminiscent of region-based memory management [50]; see especially the recent [35]
for a Hoare logic approach to regions.
Allocation and deallocation are essential operations that systems programs provide
for managing resources. But the concept of resource captured by the model in this
section is rather trivial: ID’s, without contents (essentially like LISP gensym symbols,
but with disposal). The same thing can be done with computer memory, where we
consider the resources to be cells with contents, but then we have one additional issue
to face: update.
4.4. Resource separation, pointer aliasing, and update
Next we present a model where “resource” corresponds to “portion of computer
memory”. In this model the memory is made up of cons cells, which can have basic
data (such as integers) in their components, or pointers to other cons cells. The model
presented in this section is from work on using BI to reason about pointers [22], which
builds on work of Reynolds [46]. (In fact the work on allocation and deallocation in
the previous section is also from [22,46], but for a simpliHed model where locations or
names do not have associated contents.) A related example, presented from the point
of view of a dependently-typed -calculus which is intimately related to BI, can be
found in [23].
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The inclusion of pointers brings out several issues, most importantly sharing. That
is, data structures are often constructed so that there are two or more pointers to the
same cell, as happens when considering graphs or circular or doubly-linked lists. When
this happens, there are multiple ways to refer to the same cell, or in short, there is
aliasing. For example, if we use the notations x:1 and x:2 to refer to the Hrst and
second components of a cons cell then x, y:2 and x:2:2 are all aliases in the situation
represented by the following box-and-pointer diagram:
Traditionally, aliasing complicates the logic of update, because an alteration to a
single cell can aQect the values of many syntactically unrelated expressions. The pur-
pose in this section is to illustrate how this complexity can be avoided, using resource
separation. Because aliasing and update are subtle, we treat this model in more detail
than the previous ones.
Formally, the worlds in this model are heaps h∈H , which are thought of as collec-
tions of cons cells in storage:
Val = Int ∪ {nil} ∪ Loc
H = Loc *fin Val× Val:
Here, Loc= {‘; : : :} is an inHnite set of locations and *fin is for Hnite partial functions.
Each cell in memory is identiHed by a location and when h(‘)= (a; b) this represents
a situation in which ‘ has a in its Hrst component and b in its second. When h(‘) is
undeHned this represents a situation where there is no cell in the heap corresponding
to ‘.
We use a combining operation on heaps that is partial:
h ◦ h′ denotes the union of disjoint heaps (i.e., the union of functions with disjoint
domains); e is the empty heap. When the domains of h and h′ overlap, h ◦ h′ is
undeHned.
The order we consider at this point is discrete: the equality relation on H , and the
clauses for the additive connectives remain as in the elementary monoid semantics.
This gives us a Boolean BI-algebra, where the Boolean algebra part is just the set
of subsets of H . (An alternative, intuitionistic, model is also of interest: it works
by taking the relation h h′ between worlds to be graph superset of partial
functions [46].)
In order to describe atomic propositions, we assume a function s :Var→Val
where Var= {x; y; : : :} is a set of variables. The basic proposition is the points-to
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relation, which has the form x $→E; F , where E and F range over variables, integers
and nil:
h |= x $→ E; F iQ {sx} = dom(h) and h(sx) = 〈<E=s; <F =s〉;
where <E=s gives the value of E in s. Notice the exact nature of this interpreta-
tion, where the domain of h is required to be a singleton: x $→E; F means that x
points to E; F in the current heap, and also that x is the only cell in the current
heap.
As a Hrst example in this model, the formula (x $→ 3; y) ∗ (y $→ 4; x) corresponds
to the box-and-pointer diagram pictured earlier. To relate this picture to the formal
deHnition, if the formula is true at a heap h, then we must have that sx and sy are
locations, by the deHnition of $→, and that they are distinct, by the deHnition of ∗.
For, ∗ splits h into two subheaps, one where sx is the only deHned location and the
other where sy is deHned. Notice the importance of dangling pointers here: the picture
corresponding to the left conjunct is
while that for the right is
Notice that in each subheap we have a dangling pointer, which is a location not in the
domain of the heap.
Here is a Hoare logic axiom that corresponds to an assignment to the cdr of a cons
cell [46]:
{(x $→ y; z) ∗ ’} x:2 := w {(x $→ y; w) ∗ ’}:
The idea of this axiom is as follows: If the precondition holds then, by the semantics of
∗, we know that ’ must be true for an area of memory that excludes the cell x. There-
fore, the assignment to x:2 cannot aQect ’: hence, we can slot the update to the cell
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into the postcondition, without needing to check for potential aliases in ’. By using ∗,
the operationally local nature of a heap alteration can be mirrored in
the logic.
Allocation and deallocation can be treated as in the previous subsection:
{’ ∗ (x $→ −;−)}dispose(x){’};
{’}new(x){’ ∗ (x $→ −;−)}:
In the axiom for new, we again require that x is not free in ’. The −;− notation is
used to indicate an allocated cons cell, where we are unsure of the speciHc contents.
(With quantiHers, x $→−;− can be regarded as an abbreviation for ∃yz; x $→y; z.)
Using the rules for update and disposal, here is a proof outline for a pair of statements
for deleting a node z from the middle of a linked list:
{(x $→ a; z) ∗ (y $→ c; d) ∗ (z $→ e; y)}
x:2 := y
{(x $→ a; y) ∗ (y $→ c; d) ∗ (z $→ e; y)}
dispose(z)
{(x $→ a; y) ∗ (y $→ c; d)}:
Because of the placement of ∗ we know that the Hrst statement, x:2 :=y, will not aQect
either of the assertions y $→ c; d or z $→ e; y. Similarly, ∗ ensures that in reasoning about
the dispose(z) statement we do not need to check for potential aliases in x $→ a; y or
y $→ c; d.
While ∗ is about separation, the implication −∗ can be used to describe new, or
fresh, pieces of storage. These two connectives interact in an interesting way: The
formula
(x $→ 3; 5) ∗ ((x $→ 7; 5)−∗’):
says that (x $→ 3; 5) is true in the current heap, but also that if we update the Hrst
component to 7 then ’ will be true. To see why, Hrst note that the semantics of ∗
splits the heap, say,
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into two portions, one where (x $→ 3; 5) and a second heap where the location denoted
by x is dangling:
We have included a dangling pointer out of the rest of the heap here to emphasize that
the location might be referenced from within a heap cell, as well as from x. Because the
association (x $→ 3; 5) has been, in a sense, retracted by deleting the association from
the heap in the right conjunct, this frees −∗ to extend the second heap with a diQerent
cons cell. The semantics of −∗ then ensures that ’ must be true when this second heap
is extended with a new binding of location to contents that makes (x $→ 7; 5) true:
So, the intuitive description in terms of updating follows from several steps in the
semantics, which add up to “update as deletion followed by extension”.
This idea can be used to formulate the weakest precondition for assignment state-
ments x:1 :=y and x:2 :=y that alter the Hrst or second component of a cons cell in
the heap. Similarly, −∗ can be used to formulate a weakest precondition form of the
rule for new.
We conclude by remarking that the semantic structure of this model is incompatible
with the formal system of linear logic. To see this, consider that ’( |=’→ always
holds in linear logic, using the decomposition ’→ = !’( and the rule of Dereliction
for !. However, here we have
(x $→ 1; 2)−∗⊥ |= (x $→ 1; 2)→ ⊥
because the antecedent can hold in a heap where x $→ 1; 2 while the consequent cannot.
This shows that there can be no ! which decomposes ’→ into !’−∗  in this model.
We make this point not in criticism of linear logic but merely in support of our
contention that there are interesting and naturally occurring models in which both −∗
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and → exist independently. It is natural to want to have access to the structure of these
models.
4.5. Logic programming
BI gives rise to a notion of logic programming which builds in a sharing interpre-
tation of BI’s connectives [3,37,38,41,42].
Our underlying notion of logic programming is that introduced in [32,33], based
on the sequent calculus. Programs, P, and goals, G, are modelled by the left- and
right-hand sides, respectively, of sequents
P ?−G;
read as, “Is there an instance of G which is a consequence of P?” 4
In BI, programs are bunches of formulV, consisting of data, or “facts”, and proce-
dures, made up of “program clauses”. The bunched structure gives rise to a style of
programming based on group membership, or controlled access to resources. To see
this, consider the bunch
(p(a1);p(a2)); (p(b1);p(b2)):
Here, p(x) means “x is a person”. The bunch structure shows that a1 and a2 belong
to the same group and that a1 and b1 belong to diQerent groups. To say that two
individuals may compete, we say simply
∀x; y:p(x) ∗ p(y)−∗ compete(x; y);
which is to say that x and y have access to each other only if they belong to diQerent
groups.
A logic programming language, BLP, based directly on BI has been implemented
by Pablo ArmelYZn [2,3], in the continuation-passing style, using the OCaml system
[9]. The code for the example given above, together with its Prolog equivalents, is
discussed below.
To understand the semantics of logic programming, we start with the fragment of the
logic for which uniform proofs are complete for logical consequence. Reading proofs
from the root upwards, i.e., using the rules as reduction operators [24], uniform proof
requires that right rules be applied whenever possible, so that left rules are applied
only when the right-hand side is atomic. Uniform proofs are said to be simple just in
case the implicational left rules are restricted to be essentially unary. For example, in
Hrst-order intuitionistic logic, we get
  ’[t=x] [t=x]  ;[t=x]
; ’ →   ; → L;
with , ; atomic and [t=x] = ;[t=x] (often, ’→ is retained in the left-hand premiss).
4 In general, G contains what Prolog calls “logical variables”, which are existentially quantiHed, and we
seek substitution instances of G which are consequences of P.
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In intuitionistic logic, simple uniform proofs, which are goal-directed and in which
the non-determinism is conHned 4to the choice of implicational formula, are complete
for hereditary Harrop sequents [32,33]. Simple, uniform proofs amount to the ana-
lytic notion of resolution. In BI, the corresponding class of sequents may be deHned.
Bunched hereditary Harrop formul< are given by the following grammar, in which A
denotes atoms (we simplify a bit, for brevity):
DeHnite formulV D ::= A |D ∧ D |G → A |D ∗ D |G−∗A
|∀x:D | ∀newx:D
Goal formulV G ::= A |G ∧ G |D → G |G ∗ G |D−∗G |G ∨ G
| ∃x:G | ∃newx:G
Roughly speaking, data are modelled by deHnite formulV which are atomic (and
conjunctions of atoms) and procedures are modelled by implicational deHnite formulV.
The universal quantiHers are used to express the generality of procedures and existen-
tials are used to express what in Prolog are called “logical variables” [25]. Here, for
simplicity, we suppress all Hrst-order and quantiHcational concerns.
A bunched hereditary Harrop sequent is a sequent P  G, where P is a bunch of
deHnite formulV, i.e., a program, consisting of data and procedures. Such sequents are
the basis of the bunched logic programming language BLP.
A denotational semantics for BLP (in the absence of ⊥) may be given within BI’s
elementary resource semantics by giving a reconstruction of the Kripke-style least Hxed
point semantics for intuitionistic logic programming [1,3,14,32,40]. We sketch the key
steps, for simplicity in a purely propositional setting, as follows:
• DeHne a commutative monoid
P = (P; ·; e;)
of programs-as-worlds, in which P is the set of hereditary Harrop bunches, · is ∗
and its unit e is ∅m, and Q  P just in case, for some P′, Q ≡ P;P′.
This reading of programs as worlds treats the data and procedures as accessible
resources. As we have suggested, the bunching of the two conjunctions, ∗ and ∧,
allows the expression of access restrictions between groups of data;
• Interpret goals G with respect to programs P as follows:
<G=(P) = {R |R : P  G};
where R denotes resolution proof (i.e., <G= ∈ obj([Pop;Set]), where P is the evident
preorder category of programs-as-worlds).
An Herbrand interpretation (giving a meaning to a program in terms of the atomic
formulV it is able to prove) is then obtained by taking the union of all possible
atomic goals:
<P=H ⊆
⋃
A
<A=(P):
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A complete lattice H of Herbrand interpretations, < − =H , is induced as follows:
◦ The least interpretation, H⊥, is given by
<P=H⊥ = ∅; for all P:
◦ Let <P=H1H2 = <P=H1 ∩ <P=H2 and <P=H1unionsqH2 = <P=H1 ∪ <P=H2 .◦ Let <P=H1  <P=H2 just in case <P=H1 ⊆ <P=H2 .• We can now deHne an operator, T : H→H, on Herbrand interpretations which iter-
atively constructs a model corresponding to the execution of BLP programs. There are
three cases in the iteration, arising from the form of BI’s sequent calculus [3,41,42].
The proof-theoretic details of this system are beyond our scope here but the semantic
sense of the three cases should be clear. The Hrst corresponds to instances of the
Axiom rule required in BLP [3],
P′′′ R I
P R A Axiom;
where P ≡ P′′′; A. The second corresponds to the −∗Res rule [3],
P′ R G
P R A −∗Res;
where P ≡ P′; G−∗A, and the third corresponds to the →Res rule [3],
P′ R G P′′ R I
P R A → Res;
where P ≡ P′′; (P′;G→A). Then T is deHned as follows:
<P=T(H) = {R |R : P R A and < − =H ; P′′′ |= I}
∪
{R|R : P R A; G−∗A ∈ P and < − =H ; P′|=G}
∪
{R|R : P R A; G → A ∈ P; < − =H ; P′|=G and < − =H ; P′′|=I};
where |= may be assumed to be BI’s elementary forcing relation, 5 with < − =H de-
termining the base case, i.e., < − =H provides the required assignment of atoms to
worlds, as discussed in Section 3.4;
• The operator T may readily be shown to be monotone and continuous so that, by
Tarski’s Hxed point theorem, we get a semantics for programs P via the least Hxed
5 A slight variation is that the semantics for additive implicational goals, D→G, should be given as
< − =H ; P |=D→G iQ < − =H ; (P; [D]) |=G, where [D] denotes the deHnite formula D with all top-level con-
junctions, ∧ or ∗, replaced (recursively) by “;” or “,”, respectively. This “normal form” for programs is
needed to allow the completeness of resolution proof.
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point, T!(H⊥), of T:
T!(H⊥) =
⊔
06i¡!
Ti(H⊥):
• It is a routine matter to show that we have determined a model of hereditary Harrop
BI for which the appropriate completeness property obtains: a hereditary Harrop
sequent P  G has a resolution proof iQ < − =T!(H⊥); P |=G.
The resource semantics of BLParises in two ways here. Firstly, as we have seen, our
reading of programs as worlds treats the data and procedures in programs as accessible
resources. Secondly, each of the strata of <P=T!(H⊥), i.e., each power of T, is composed
of proofs which are representable as terms of the -calculus to which the sharing
interpretation described in [38,42] applies directly. The details of BLP’s deterministic
operational semantics, and the resource semantics for the construction of proofs that
provides, are beyond the scope of this example; see [3].
Applications of BLP are concerned with controlled access to resources. Recall the
example of competing individuals belonging to diQerent groups introduced at the be-
ginning of this section.
A complete BLP program to describe this set-up is given below. Here, T is 
, the
unit of ∧, and [−] is additive universal quantiHcation. 6
(p(a1); p(a2)),
(p(b1); p(b2)),
[x,y]compete(x,y) *- p(x) * p(y) * T
Notice that the deHnition of compete has been slightly modiHed to take into account
that there might be more than two groups; but they may be disregarded.
An alternative solution would be to decorate each group with a multiplicative unit
to signal that it can be ignored. So we might have for example
(p(a1); p(a2); I),
(p(b1); p(b2); I),
(p(a5); p(a6); I)
However, the Hrst approach is to be recommended since it doesn’t produce redundant
solutions. Adding a unit to each group allows the unit operation to be performed in
diQerent places, but without changing the solution.
The following is an equivalent Prolog program for this problem. It uses tags to
distinguish the groups:
p(a1,t1).
p(a2,t1).
p(b1,t2).
p(b2,t2).
compete(X,Y):- p(X,T), p(Y,U), T\=U.
6 Note that predicate BI, in addition to the usual additive predication and quantiHcation found in intu-
itionistic logic and linear logic, also admits multiplicative predication and quantiHers [38,41,42]. This topic
is beyond our present scope.
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Thinking of political parties as an example of groups, sometimes they split into rival
factions but each faction in turn might want to keep its former allies. This situation
might be represented by the bunch (p(a1); p(a2)), (p(b1); (p(b21); p(b22)), (p(b23);
p(b24))). Notice that b21 competes with a1 and a2 but also with b23 and b24. If we
call x and y allies if they do not compete, then despite b1’s being an ally of b21, and
also of b23, b21 and b23 are not allies. The modiHcation of the program to reJect this
state of aQairs is straightforward:
(p(a1); p(a2)),
(p(b1); (p(b21); p(b22)), (p(b23); p(b24))),
[x,y]compete(x,y)*-p(x)*p(y)*T
Notice that the de8ning clause needed no modi8cation.
To modify the Prolog program we could start by adding an extra tag to reJect the
structure of the problem like this
p(a1,t1,_).
p(a2,t1,_).
p(b1,t2,_).
p(b21,t2,t1).
p(b22,t2,t1).
p(b23,t2,t2).
p(b24,t2,t2).
compete(X,Y):- p(X,T,_), p(Y,U,_), T\=U.
compete(X,Y):- p(X,T,V), p(Y,U,W), T=U, V\=W
and we should be aware that the whole program has had to be modiHed to account for
the extra tag. Alternatively, a more Jexible implementation may be used, like using
lists of tags as a second argument:
p(a1,[t1]).
p(a2,[t1]).
p(b1,[t2]).
p(b21,[t2,t1]).
p(b22,[t2,t1]).
p(b23,[t2,t2]).
p(b24,[t2,t2]).
compete(X,Y):- p(X,U), p(Y,S), mismatch(U,S).
mismatch([H1|_], [H2|_]):- H1\=H2.
mismatch([H1|T1], [H2|T2]):- H1=H2, mismatch(T1,T2).
Please note the complexity of this solution compared to the simplicity of the BLP version.
The bunch structure also helps to give Hne control over the scope of predicates.
In the example above, we can think of a variety of ways in which constants can be
predicated. For example a2 might be a special kind of person. It would be possible to
modify the program in the following way:
(p(a1); q(a2); [x]p(x) <-q(x)),
(p(b1); (p(b21); q(b22)), (p(b23); p(b24))),
[x,y]compete(x,y)*-p(x)*p(y)*T
Now this program says that a2 is a q but also that all qs are ps. However, this relation
between ps and qs holds only for the group formed by a1 and a2, i.e., is local to that
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world. Other qs appearing in other places in the program, for example b22, will not
be picked up by the local implication, →. Note that this local implication matches the
“;” combining p(a1) and q(a2).
4.6. Money
We Hnish this section with an example based on cost; speciHcally, the use of money
to purchase goods. We do this to make a contrast with the well-known resource reading
of linear logic, exempliHed by Girard’s famous “Marlboro’s and Camels” example.
In this example, the resources are coins, which can be used to buy chocolates or
candy from a vending machine. (This, of course, is borrowed from C.A.R. Hoare.) A
model for the discussion in this section is given by the natural numbers, with addition
as ◦ and the usual interpretation of .
A proposition is a statement about cost and the judgement of consequence is read
as follows:
’   : If I have enough money to make ’ true; then I have enough
to make  true:
We posit meanings for the connectives as follows:
’ →  : If I were to obtain enough money to make ’ true; then I should
also have enough to make  true;
’ ∧  : The money I have got is enough to make ’ true and enough
to make  true;
’ ∨  : The money I have got is enough to make ’ true or to make  true;
’−∗  : If you were to give me enough to make ’ true then; combined
with what I have already got in my pocket; I should have enough to
make  true; and
’ ∗  : I can use part of my money to make ’ true and have enough
left over to make  true (and vice versa):
We hope the reader can take these informal descriptions in good spirit.
Given these readings the following judgements say that for one coin I can buy a
candy and for two I can buy a chocolate.
(A1) coin  candy, and
(A2) coin ∗ coin  choc,
where the basic propositions are
• coin : I have (at least) one coin in my pocket,
• choc : I have enough to buy a chocolate, and
• candy : I have enough to buy a candy.
Here we are regarding (A1) and (A2) as axioms, so coin  choc: we indend that you
must have at least two coins to buy a chocolate.
With this as background, we now move onto consider some judgements which illus-
trate the most important, or unusual, consequences of the readings. Certainly, the most
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distinctive feature of BI is its joint treatment of the two implications. As an example
of how −∗ works, we certainly expect
• coin  coin−∗ choc
because if I have a coin in my pocket, and if you give me another, then I will have
enough to buy a chocolate. However,
• coin  coin→choc
because a single coin is not enough to buy a chocolate.
It is here that the reader will detect similarity with Girard’s “Marlboro’s and Camels”
reading of linear logic [21]. However, the divergences are both more interesting than
the similarities and illustrate how great is the diQerence between BI and linear logic.
First, and foremost, Girard’s reading is about “proofs-as-actions” where, for example,
• choc: the (type of the) act of buying a chocolate.
In contrast, our reading is not about proofs. We do not regard a proposition as a
resource and (so) a proof as a way to manipulate resources. Rather, the reading is
completely declarative: a proposition is a statement about the world whose judgement
of truth may involve consideration of resources.
Secondly, the diQerence is not merely one of emphasis but can be seen on the level
of logical consequence. For instance,
• coin−∗ choc  coin→choc
is something we would expect, because coin−∗ choc is true when you have one coin in
your pocket but coin→choc is not. In linear logic, however, where ’→ is rendered
as !’( , one gets
• coin(choc  coin→choc(= !coin(choc)
no matter what coin and choc are, because one can compose on the left with dereliction
!’  ’.
There are other examples in BI which violate the “use once” idea from linear logic
(here I is the unit of the multiplicative conjunction, ∗):
• I  (coin ∧ (coin→choc))−∗ choc, and
• I  coin−∗ ((coin→coin→choc)→choc).
Now these judgements seem wrong from the point of view of linear logic because
• I  (coin&(!coin(choc))(choc, and
• I  coin(!(!coin((!coin(choc))(choc.
The Hrst case would violate the idea that a linear function of type A&B(C must use
one of its input components but not both, and the second would violate the idea that a
linear function cannot use its argument twice. However, if one discards this perspective
and thinks declaratively, using the reading of formulV advanced in this section, then
the truth of BI’s judgements is straightforward.
In BI, the proof of the last judgement, when viewed as an -term [37,38,42], does
indeed use its argument twice. Indeed, in [38] we advanced a resource reading of
proofs to justify this judgement; the declarative justiHcation is much more immediate.
All of the true judgements we have claimed in this section, and non-judgements, are
correct with respect to the semantics of this paper. (That is, when we assume (A1)
and (A2) as axioms.) All told, what this indicates is that BI and (intuitionistic) linear
logic are incomparable extensions of intuitionistic logic, and the basic substructural
logic (sometimes called BCI logic or multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic [12]).
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That is, when we consider formulV which mix additives and multiplicatives, we have
some judgements that hold in BI but not linear logic; and some the other way around.
While the “proofs-as-actions” reading of linear logic is very appealing, and gives a
consistent way of understanding the semantics of the judgements above given by linear
logic’s consequence relation, we claim that the declarative resource reading gives a
clear justiHcation for the exact opposite position on the corresponding judgements, the
position taken by BI.
5. Topological forcing semantics
There are several mathematical ways to incorporate the kind of partiality found in
the pointer model, including taking a partial operation as primitive [19] and taking a
ternary relation semantics as primitive. For now, however, we show how to handle
inconsistency without resorting to partiality in the semantics. To this end, we observe
some of the lessons learnt in the model theory of intuitionistic logic (see [16,28]).
BrieJy, Kripke models are a special form of topological model, in which the open
sets are the downwards-closed subsets of a preorder: Topological models are, in turn,
a special kind of Grothendieck sheaf model. Pragmatically speaking, since topological
ideas give rise to many interesting models of intuitionistic logic, we would like to have
access to these in the model theory of BI.
While it is possible (see recent work by Galmiche et al. [19]) to give sound and
complete elementary models of BI with ⊥ using partial monoids, we believe the topo-
logical (sheaf-theoretic) methods which we adopt in this section, as in [37,38,41,42],
give an appropriate level of clarity and elegance whilst retaining the total semantics. 7
Moreover, whilst our Hrst class of topological models, based on sheaves, weakens our
semantic basis in resources, this basis is recovered in our second class of topological
models, based on Grothendieck sheaves over preordered monoids.
Returning to our theoretical development, we describe three classes of models based
on topological structures:
• Open topological monoids;
• Sheaves on open topological monoids;
• Grothendieck sheaves on preordered monoids.
Each of these classes of topological models yields (soundness and) completeness the-
orems for BI. The unifying feature of these models in respect of completeness is their
internalization of inconsistency via their semantics for ⊥.
We present the Hrst two brieJy, as stepping stones on our way to our Hnal notion
of model, for which we present a detailed proof of soundness and completeness. Our
main addition in each case will be to include an appropriate continuity condition on
the monoid operation in question.
7 As we have seen in Section 4.4, in which we discussed a model of BI based on pointers, partial
monoids may be seen as a natural basis for resource modelling. Note, however, that we show in Section 5.4
the pointers model may be rendered as a Grothendieck sheaf-theoretic model.
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5.1. Open topological monoids
A (commutative) topological monoid is a (commutative) monoid in the category
Top of topological spaces and continuous maps between them, i.e., a topological space
X, with open sets O(X), together with two arrows, a tensor product ∗ : X ×X → X
and its unit e : 1→ X such that the usual monoidal diagrams commute [30].
We need to interpret a formula ’ ∗  as the tensor product, U ∗V of the interpreta-
tions, respectively U and V , of ’ and  . The tensor product of two open sets is not
necessarily open, however. Consequently, we must require that the monoidal structure
be deHned by open maps, i.e., which map open sets to open sets.
An open topological monoid is one in which the maps ∗ and e, which deHne the
monoidal structure are open.
Lemma 8 (distributivity). Let (X; ∗; e) be a topological monoid. Then, for all open
sets U , Vi, i ∈ I, where I is some indexing set,
U ∗
(⋃
i
Vi
)
=
⋃
i
(U ∗ Vi):
Proof. z ∈U ∗(⋃i Vi) iQ there exist x ∈ U and yj ∈ Vj, for some j, such that z= x∗yj
iQ z ∈ ⋃i (U ∗ Vi).
The interpretation of BI in an open topological monoid now follows exactly as for
the interpretation of intuitionistic logic in a topological space, i.e., with <⊥== ∅, with
the addition of the following:
<’ ∗  = = <’= ∗ < =
<I = = e(1)
and if <’==U and < ==V , then
<’−∗  = = ⋃
i∈I
Wi;
where each Wi is such that Wi ∗ U ⊆V . This interpretation is well-deHned:
Lemma 9 (Multiplicative function space). <’−∗  = ∗ <’=⊆ < =.
Proof. We have
⋃
i∈I (Wi ∗U )⊆V , so that
(⋃
i∈I Wi
) ∗U ⊆V , by distributivity.
We can obtain soundness and completeness for these models just as for BI-algebras.
5.2. Sheaf-theoretic models
An alternative way to give a topological semantics to BI, instead of the algebraic
treatment in Section 5.1, is to give a forcing semantics in the category of sheaves over
a topological monoid.
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Table 3
Semantics in sheaves
U |= p iQ <p=(U ) = ∅ for p ∈ L
U |=’ ∗  iQ for some V; V ′ ∈ O(X); U ⊆ V ◦ V ′ and V |=’ and V ′ |=  
U |=’−∗  iQ for all V ∈ O(X); V |=’ implies U ◦ V |=  
U |=’ ∧  iQ U |=’ and U |=  
U |=’ ∨  iQ for some V; V ′ ∈ O(X) such that U = V ∪ V ′;
V |=’ and V ′ |=  
U |=’→  iQ for all V ⊆ U; V |=’ implies V |=  
U |= for all U ∈ O(X)
U |= I iQ U ⊆ I
U |=⊥ iQ U = ∅
We start with a commutative open topological monoid, X=(X; ∗; e). The symmetric
monoidal structure of a (commutative) topological monoid, X, gives rise, via Day’s
construction of a tensor product [11,38], to a symmetric monoidal closed structure on
the category Sh(X) of sheaves on X [42].
De/nition 10. Let L be a set of propositional letters. Let (X; ∗; e) be an open topolog-
ical monoid and let P(L) denote the collection of BI propositions over a language L
of propositional letters. A topological Kripke BI-model is a triple
〈Sh(X); |=; < − =〉;
where |=⊆O(X )×P(L), satisfying the conditions in Table 3 and < − = :P(L) * Sh(X)
is a partial function from the BI propositions over L to the objects of Sh(X) such that:
Kripke monotonicity: If V ⊆U , then, for each ’ ∈ P(L), U |=’ implies V |=’.
As before, wherever no confusion will arise, we shall refer to a model
〈Sh(X); |=; < − =〉
simply as X.
It is a routine matter to check that this deHnition is consistent with the usual pre-
sentation of the sheaf-theoretic semantics of intuitionistic logic [31].
As usual, we write U |=X  just in case U |=X ’, where ’ is the formula obtained
from  by replacing each “,” by ∗ and each “;” by ∧. We then write  |=X ’ just in
case, for all U in X, if U |=X , then U |=X ’. Finally, we write  |=’ just in case,
for all X, |=X’.
Theorem 11 (Soundness and completeness).   ’ if and only if  |=’.
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We do not give detailed proofs of the soundness and completeness of BI for topo-
logical Kripke BI-models, preferring to give these results to the more general setting
of Grothendieck sheaves in Section 5.3. The details of these results can be found in
[42], for both propositional BI and predicate BI [41]. However, a few remarks will
be informative. We sketch the construction of a term model, which is the basis of a
completeness proof [42]. We deHne a term topological Kripke BI-model, in which we
suppress the routine deHnition of < − =, as follows:
• |X| is B= , where B is the set of sets of consistent bunches and where  is
the evident equality generated by derivability, i.e., if S and S ′ are sets of consistent
bunches, then S  S ′ iQ, for any ∈ S, there exists ′ ∈ S ′ such that ’  ’′ .
• Open sets are elements of X closed under prime evaluation of bunches. The prime
evaluation, & ', of a bunch  is constructed as follows:
◦ Close under consequences generated by the propositions in . For example, closing
=(’; ’−∗  ) under consequences requires evaluating the bunch to ( ), and
closing =(’ ∗  ) under consequences requires evaluating such a bunch to
(’;  ). Let
 
 denote the result of all such evaluations of a bunch  (see [42]
for the details).
◦ Extend , using “;”, with the bunch  , to get & '=;
 
 (and, obviously, we
can treat “;” as set union). The bunch & ' is such that if   ’, then & '  ’,
if & '  ’, then & '= & '(’), and has the disjunction property.
So, for any open set O, if S ∈O is a set of bunches and ∈ S, then & ' ∈ S.
Note that prime evaluation generates a set of bunches.
• The monoid operation, ◦, is given by the consistent prime evaluation of the combina-
tion of bunches using the comma, “,”: ∗ ∼= &;  ', where ∼= denotes isomorphism
of labelled trees, so that
{1; : : : ; m} ◦ {1; : : : ; n} =
{ 1 ∗ 1 ; 1 ∗ 2 ; : : :
2 ∗ 1 ; 2 ∗ 2 ; : : :
... ;
... ; : : : }\⊥(; )
where ⊥(; )= {i ∗ j|i ∗ j  ⊥}.
• The unit, e is given by { ∅m }, where ∅m is the unit of “,”.
• <’=()= {C|C is a proof of   ’ }. Here we intend a restriction of C to normal
proofs in BI’s natural deduction system [38,41,42].
Notice that we remove the inconsistent bunches and that we will always be left with
at least the empty set. This property of the term model, together with the appropriate
modiHcation of the forcing clause for ⊥, yields completeness. To see this, consider the
following example: Let p ∈ L. Then both p and p−∗⊥ are consistent bunches but their
monoidal combination is not. However, it is easy to see that
& p ◦ p−∗⊥'= {(p ◦ p−∗⊥;⊥)}\{(p ◦ p−∗⊥;⊥)}
= ∅
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and ∅ |=⊥. How is this to be seen as being consistent with the elementary forcing
semantics, in which ⊥ is never forced? The answer is simply that, in order for com-
pleteness to go through in the presence of inconsistency, we must use a setting in
which “never” is part of the model: the empty set Hlls exactly this roˆle: just as in
the elementary monoid semantics, models inhabit functor categories SetM
op
but for
completeness with ⊥, we reHne this setting to that of sheaves (with the corresponding
modiHcation of the forcing relation) on an M which is a topological space.
5.3. Grothendieck sheaf-theoretic models
In this section, we give a class of models which generalizes the ones we have so far
described and in which we give detailed proofs of soundness and completeness. We
work with Grothendieck topologies [31], the algebraic generalization of topological
spaces, on preordered commutative monoids. This setting allows us to recover the
appealing simplicity of the elementary preordered commutative monoid semantics whilst
retaining the topological treatment of inconsistency, via the empty set, which gives rise
to completeness in the presence of ⊥. The connection between the two topological
formulations is the usual one [31].
De/nition 12 (GTM). A Grothendieck Topological Monoid is a structure
M = 〈M; ◦; e;; J 〉;
where 〈M; ◦; e;〉 is a preordered commutative monoid and J is a map J : M →
˝(˝(M)) satisfying the following:
1. Sieve: for any m∈M and S ∈ J (m), “S m, i.e., for any m′ ∈ S, m′m.
2. Maximality: for any n′ such that n′= n, {n′} is in J (n).
3. Stability: for any m, n∈M and S ∈ J (m) such that nm, there exists S ′ ∈ J (n)
such that “S ′ S”: for any n′ ∈ S ′, there exists m′ ∈ S such that n′m′.
4. Transitivity: for any m∈M , S ∈ J (m) and {Sm′ ∈ J (m′)}m′∈S ,
⋃
m′∈S Sm′ ∈ J (m).
5. Continuity: for any m, n∈M and S ∈ J (m) “S ◦n∈ J (m◦n), i.e., {m′ ◦n |m′ ∈ S}∈
J (m ◦ n).
Such a J is usually called a Grothendieck topology.
De/nition 13 (GTI). Let M be a GTM and P(L) be the collection of BI propositions
over a language L of propositional letters, a Grothendieck Topological Interpretation,
GTI, is a function < − = : L→˝(M) satisfying:
6. (K): for any m; n∈M such that m n, n∈ <p= implies m∈ <p=;
7. (Sh): for any m∈M and S ∈ J (m), if, for all m′ ∈ S, m′ ∈ <p=, then m∈ <p=.
De/nition 14 (GRM). A Grothendieck Resource Model, or GRM, is a triple G= 〈M;
|=; < − =〉 in which M= 〈M; ◦; e;; J 〉 is a GTM, < − = is a GTI and |= is a forcing
relation on M ×P(L) satisfying the conditions given in Table 4.
De/nition 15. Let G be a GRM and ’ be the formula obtained from a bunch  by
replacing each “;” by ∧ and each “,” by ∗ with association respecting the tree structure
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Table 4
Semantics in Grothendieck sheaves
m |=p iQ m∈ <p=
m |= iQ always
m |=’∧  iQ m |=’ and m |=  
m |=’→  iQ for any nm, if n |=’, then n |=  
m |=’∨  iQ there exists S ∈ J (m) such that for any m′ ∈ S,
m′ |=’ or m′ |=  
m |=⊥ iQ ∅∈ J (m)
m |= I iQ there exists S ∈ J (m) such that for any m′ ∈ S, m′ e
m |=’ ∗  iQ there exists S ∈ J (m) such that for any m′ ∈ S,
there exist n’; n ∈M such that
m′ n’ ◦ n , n’ |=’ and n |=  
m |=’−∗  iQ for any n, if n |=’ then n ◦m |=  
of , a sequent  ’ is said to be valid in G, written  |=G ’, if and only if, for any
world m∈M , m |=’ implies m |=’. A sequent  ’ is valid, written  |=’, iQ, for
any GRM G, it is valid in G.
The Hrst two results give the well-deHnedness of the Grothendieck semantics.
Lemma 16. Given an interpretation <− = which makes (K) and (Sh) hold for atomic
propositions, (K) holds for the interpretation of any BI proposition .
Proof. For any m; n∈M such that nm and m |= , we must show n |= . The proof
proceeds by the induction on the structure of the proposition . In most of the cases,
the inductive step is immediate. We give just those cases which diQer from the corre-
sponding ones in the preordered commutative monoid semantics.
• =’∨  : since m |=’∨  , there exists Sm ∈ J (m) such that for all m′ ∈ Sm, m′ |=’
or m′ |=  . By the stability axiom, there exists Sn ∈ J (n) such that for all n′ ∈ Sn,
n′m′ for some m′ ∈ Sm. Then, by the induction hypothesis, n′ |=’ or n′ |=  for
any n′ ∈ Sn.
• =⊥: since m |=⊥, ∅∈ J (m). By the stability axiom, ∅∈ J (n).
• = I : since m |= I , there exists Sm ∈ J (m) such that m′ e for all m′ ∈ Sm. By the
stability axiom, there is Sn ∈ J (n) such that for any n′ ∈ Sn, n′m′ for some m′ ∈ Sm.
Then, for any n′ ∈ Sn, n′ e.
• =’ ∗  : since m |=’ ∗  , there exists Sm ∈ J (m) such that for any m′ ∈ Sm, there
exist am′ ; bm′ such that m′ am′ ◦ bm′ , am′ |=’ and bm′ |=  . By the stability axiom,
there exists Sn ∈ J (n) such that for any n′ ∈ Sn, n′m′ for some m′ ∈ Sm, from
which n′ am′ ◦ bm′ follows. Therefore, for any n′ ∈ Sn, there exist an′ ; bn′ such that
n an′ ◦ bn′ , an′ |=’ and bn′ |=  .
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Lemma 17. Given an intepretation < − = which makes (K) and (Sh) hold for atomic
propositions, (Sh) holds for the interpretation of any BI proposition .
Proof. For any m∈M and S ∈ J (m) such that m′ |=  for all m′ ∈ S, we should show
that m |=’. We use the induction on the structure of .
• =p: this case follows from the assumptions about < − =.
• =
: for any n∈M including the case that n=m, n |=’.
• =’∧  : for any m′ ∈ S, m′ |=’ and m′ |=  . By induction hypothesis, m |=’ and
m |=  .
• =’→  : for any nm such that n |=’, by the stability axiom, there exists
Sn ∈ J (n) such that for any n′ ∈ Sn, n′m′ for some m′ ∈ S. Also, n′ n by the
sieve condition on Sn. By (K), as stated in Lemma 16, n′ |=’→  and n′ |=’,
which implies n′ |=  . By the induction hypothesis, n |=  .
• =’∨  : for any m′ ∈ S, there exists Sm′ ∈ J (m′) such that for any u∈ Sm′ , u |=’
or u |=  . Let Sm =
⋃
m′∈S Sm′ . Then, Sm ∈ J (m) because of the transitivity axiom.
Moreover, for any u∈ Sm, u |=’ or u |=  . Therefore, m |=’∨  .
• =⊥: for any m′ ∈ S, m′ |=⊥ and so ∅∈ J (m′). Since ∅= ⋃m′∈S ∅ is in J (m) by
the transitivity axiom, m |=⊥.
• = I : for any m′ ∈ S, there exists Sm′ ∈ J (m′) such that u e for any u∈ Sm′ . Let
Sm =
⋃
m′∈S Sm′ . Then Sm ∈ J (m) by the transitivity axiom. Moreover, for any u∈ Sm,
u e. Therefore, m |= I .
• =’ ∗  : for any m′ ∈ S, there exists Sm′ ∈ J (m′) such that for any u∈ Sm′ , there
exist au; bu such that u au ◦ bu, au |=A and bu |=B. Let Sm =
⋃
m′ ∈ S Sm′ . Then, by
the transitivity axiom, Sm ∈ J (m). Moreover, for any u∈ Sm, there exist au; bu such
that u au ◦ bu, au |=’ and bu |=  . Therefore, m |=’ ∗  .
• =’−∗  : for any n such that n |=’, let Sn◦m = {n ◦m′ |m′ ∈ S}. Then by the conti-
nuity axiom, Sn◦m ∈ J (n ◦m). For any m′ ∈ S, since m′ |=’−∗  , n ◦m′ |=  . That is,
for any u∈ Sn◦m, u |=  . By the induction hypothesis, n ◦m |=  .
The class of models in GTMs includes the models in elementary preordered com-
mutative monoids, given in Section 3.2, in the following sense:
Proposition 18. For any preordered commutative monoid (M; ◦; e;  ), let J (m)=
{{m′} |m′=m}. Then
• (M; ◦; e;  ; J ) satis8es all of the axioms in this section;
• (K) implies (Sh); and
• when an interpretation makes (K) hold for atomic propositions, the interpretations
of ’∨  ;⊥; ’ ∗  ; I can be simpli8ed as follows:
m |= ⊥ i= never
m |= ’ ∨  i= m |= ’ or m |=  
m |= ’ ∗  i= there exist n’; n such that
m  n’ ◦ n ; n’ |= ’ and n |=  
m |= I i= m  e
298 D.J. Pym et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 315 (2004) 257–305
BI is sound and complete with respect to GRMs (we shall sometimes refer to these
as “GTM models”). For simplicity, we establish these results for GRMs with respect
to BI’s Hilbert system, HBI, described in Section 3.
Proposition 19 (Soundness). For any BI propositions ’ and  , if ’  , then ’ |=  
in any GTM model.
Proof. It is standard that 
, ∧, →, ⊥, ∨ induce a Heyting algebra. We show that I ,
∗ and −∗ induce a residuated commutative monoid structure
• (I; ∗) induce a monotone commutative monoidal structure
1
(’ ∗  ) ∗  |=’ ∗ ( ∗ )
2
’ ∗ ( ∗ ) |=(’ ∗  ) ∗ 
3
’ ∗ I |=’
4
’ |=’ ∗ I
5
’ ∗  |=  ∗ ’
’ |=   |= H
6
’ ∗  |=  ∗ H
1. The proof of this case follows from the following lemma:
Lemma. For any m∈M and BI propositions ’0,  0 and 0, m |=(’0 ∗  0) ∗ 0 i=
there exists S ∈ J (m) such that for any m′ ∈ S, there exists am′ , bm′ and cm′ in M
such that m′ (am′ ◦ bm′) ◦ cm′ , am′ |=’0, bm′ |=  0 and cm′ |= 0.
Suppose the above lemma holds. Then, by the associativity and commutativity of
◦, m |=(’ ∗  ) ∗  iQ m |=( ∗ ) ∗ ’. As will be shown in 5, this is equivalent to
m |=’∗( ∗). The proof of the above lemma proceeds using axioms of a Grothendieck
topology, as follows:
if: for any m′ ∈ S, since {am′ ◦ bm′}∈ J (am′ ◦ bm′) by the maximality axiom,
am′ ◦ bm′ |=’0 ∗  0. Therefore, m |=(’0 ∗  0) ∗ 0.
only if: since m |=(’0 ∗  0) ∗ 0, there exists S ∈ J (m) such that for any m′ ∈ S,
there exist nm′ and cm′ such that m′ nm′ ◦ cm′ , nm′ |=’0 ∗  0 and cm′ |= 0.
We will show that for any m′ in S, there exists Sm′ such that for any
d∈ Sm′ , there exist am′ ; bm′ satisfying that d (am′ ◦ bm′) ◦ cm′ , am′ |=’ and
bm′ |=  . Then, the conclusion follows from Sm =
⋃
m′∈S Sm′ , which is in
J (m) by the transitivity axiom. Let us choose m′ in S. Since nm′ |=’0 ∗  0,
there exists Snm′ such that for any u∈ Snm′ , there exist au and bu satisfy-
ing that u au ◦ bu, au |=’0 and bu |=  0. Let Snm′ ◦ cm′ = {u ◦ cm′ | u∈ Snm′ }.
Then, by the continuity of ◦, Snm′ ◦ cm′ ∈ J (nm′ ◦ cm′). Since m′ nm′ ◦ cm′ ,
by the stability axiom, there exists Sm′ ∈ J (m′) such that for any d∈ Sm′ ,
d u ◦ cm′ for some u∈ Snm′ , which, by the monotonicity of ◦, implies that
d (au ◦ bu) ◦ cm′ .
2. this case is handled while proving case 1.
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3. for any m∈M such that m |=’ ∗ I , there exists S ∈ J (m) such that for any m′ ∈ S,
there exist am′ ; bm′ in M such that m′ am′ ◦ bm′ , am′ |=’ and bm′ |= I . By the inter-
pretation of I , for any m′ ∈ S, there exists Sbm′ ∈ J (bm′) such that for any u∈ Sbm′ ,
u e. By the continuity of ◦, for any m′ ∈ S, {am′ ◦ u | u∈ Sbm′ }∈ J (am′ ◦ bm′). For
any m′ ∈ S and u∈ Sbm′ , since am′ ◦ u am′ ◦ e= am′ and am′ |=’, by (K), am′ ◦ u |=’.
Therefore, by (Sh), am′ ◦ bm′ |=’, and since m′  am′ ◦ bm′ , (K) implies that m′ |=’
for all m′ ∈ S.
4. for any m∈M such that m |=’, since m=m ◦ e, {m ◦ e}∈ J (m). Since {e}∈ J (e)
and e e, e |= I . Therefore, m |=’ ∗ I .
5. for any m∈M such that m |=’ ∗  , there exists S ∈ J (m) such that for any m′ ∈ S,
there exist am′ ; bm′ in M such that am′ |=’, bm′ |=  and m′ am′ ◦ bm′ . Since ◦ is
commutative, for any m′ ∈ S, m′ bm′ ◦ am′ . Therefore, m |=’ ∗  .
6. for any m∈M such that m |=’ ∗ , there is S ∈ J (m) such that for any m′ ∈ S, there
exist am′ ; cm′ in M such that am′ |=’, cm′ |=  and m′ am′ ◦ cm′ . Since ’ |=  and
 |= H, for any m′ ∈ S, am′ |=  and cm′ |= H. Therefore, m |=  ∗ H.
• (∗;−∗ ) induce a residuated (closed) structure.
’ ∗  |= 
1
’ |=  −∗ 
’ |=  −∗ 
2
’ ∗  |= 
• for any m; n∈M such that m |=’ and n |=  , by the maximality axiom, {m ◦ n} is
in J (m ◦ n), from which it follows that m ◦ n |=’ ∗  . Since ’ ∗  |= , m ◦ n |= .
• for any m∈M such that m |=’ ∗  , by the interpretation of ∗, there exists S ∈ J (m)
such that for any m′ ∈ S, there exist am′ and bm′ in S such that m′; am′ ◦ bm′ ,
am′ |=’ and bm′ |=  . Since ’ |=  −∗ , for any m′ ∈ S, am′ |=  −∗ , from which it
follows that am′ ◦ bm′ |= . By (K), m′ |=  for all m′ ∈ S. By (Sh), m |= .
Proposition 20 (Completeness). For any two BI propositions, if ’ |=  in all GTM
models, then ’  .
Proof. The proof proceeds in a similar way to that for the completeness of (⊥;∨)-
free fragments, which can be seen, essentially, as constructing a complete model and
using Yoneda embedding. Here, in contrast to the term model described for sheaves,
disjunction is handled via the Grothendieck topology, J . The treatment of additives
is standard, following the treatment for intuitionistic logic [39]. We present the com-
pleteness argument for intuitionistic as well as substructural connectives, in order to
be self-contained.
DeHne a GTM as follows:
• M is an equivalent class of a proposition ’, written [’], with respect to the relation
given by provability.
• [’] [ ] iQ ’  . It can be easily shown that the choice of ’ and  does not
matter.
• [’] ◦ [ ] = [’ ∗  ]. Also, it can be easily shown that the choice does not matter.
• e= [I ].
300 D.J. Pym et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 315 (2004) 257–305
• J ([’]) is a collection of a Hnite (possibly empty) family {[’1]; : : : ; [’n]} such
that [’i] [’] for all i and [’] [’1 ∨ · · · ∨ ’n]. Here again, the choice doesn’t
matter.
We claim that the above entities do indeed satisfy all of the conditions required for
a model. It is straightforward to show that (M;  ; ◦; e) is a preordered commutative
monoid and that J satisHes the sieve and maximality axioms. We deal with the other
three conditions.
• Stability: for any [’]; [ ]∈M and {[’l]}l∈ L ∈ J ([’]) such that [ ] [’], let us con-
sider the family {[’l ∧  ]}l∈ L. Since for any l∈L, [’l ∧  ] [ ] and [ ] [
∨
l∈L
(’l ∧  )], the family {[’l ∧  ]}l∈ L belongs to J ([ ]). Moreover, [’l ∧  ] [’l] for
all l∈L, from which the other requirement for the stability axiom follows.
• Transitivity: for any [’]∈M , {[’l]}l∈ L ∈ J ([’]) and {{[’kl ]}k ∈Kl ∈ J ([’l])}l∈ L,
let S = {[’kl ]}l∈ L;k ∈Kl . From the deHnition of J , for any l∈L and k ∈Kl, [’kl ] [’l]
 [’]. Again, from the deHnition of J , [’] [∨l∈L ’l] [∨l∈L∨k∈Kl ’kl ], which im-
plies [’] [∨l∈L; k∈Kl ’kl ]. Therefore, S is in J ([’]).• Continuity: for any [’]; [ ]∈M and {[’l]}l∈ L ∈ J ([’]), let’s consider the family
{[’l ∗  ]}l∈ L. Then [’l ∗  ] [’ ∗  ] for any l∈L and [’ ∗  ] [(
∨
l∈L ’l) ∗
 ] = [
∨
l∈L(’l ∗  )].
Let the interpretation <− = of atomic propositions be given by <p== {[’] |’ p}. Notice
that < − = satisHes (K) and (Sh). The resulting model has the following property:
For any two propositions ’0 and  0; [’0] |=  0 iQ ’0   0:
Before considering why the above property holds, notice that the completeness result
follows from it in the usual way. We show the above property by the induction on the
structure of  0.
•  0 = p: this case follows from the deHnition of < − =.
•  0 =
: both [’0] |=
 and ’0 
 always hold.
•  0 =’∧  :
[’0] |=’∧  iQ [’0] |=’ and [’0] |=  iQ (by the induction hypothesis) ’0 ’ and
’0   iQ ’0 ’∧  .
•  0 =’→  :
if: for any [’1] such that [’1] [’0] and [’1] |=’, ’1 ’ by the induction
hypothesis, From the deHnition of  , ’1 ’0. Therefore, ’1 ’→  and
’1   . Again, by the induction hypothesis, [’1] |=  ;
only if: since ’0 ∧’’, [’0 ∧’] |=’ by the induction hypothesis. Since [’0 ∧’]
[’0], [’0 ∧’] |=  . Again, by the induction hypothesis, ’0 ∧’  . There-
fore, ’0 ’→  .
•  0 =’∨  :
if: consider S = {[’0 ∧’]; [’0 ∧  ]}. Then, [’0 ∧’] [’0] and [’0 ∧  ] [’0]
and [’0] [’0 ∧ (’∨  )]= [(’0 ∧’)∨ (’0 ∧  )]. Therefore, S ∈ J ([’0]).
Moreover, by the induction hypothesis, [’0 ∧’] |=’ and [’0 ∧  ] |=  . Thus,
[’0] |=’∨  ;
only if: since [’0] |=’∨  , there exist S ∈ J ([’0]) such that for any [’′]∈ S, [’′]
|=’ or [’′] |=  . By induction hypothesis, for any ’′ ∈ S, ’′ ’ or ’′   ,
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which implies ’′ ’∨  . ∨’′∈S ’′ ’∨  follows from this. Since [’0]
[
∨
’′∈S ’
′], ’0 ’∨  .
•  0 =⊥: [’0] |=⊥ iQ ∅∈ J ([’0]) iQ [’0] [⊥] iQ ’0 ⊥. This case is the counterpart
to the ∅ |=⊥ case in the sheaf-theoretic semantics discussed in Section 5.2.
•  0 = I :
if: {[’0]}∈ J ([’0]) and [’0] e= [I ] because ’0  I . Therefore, [’0] |= I ;
only if: since [’0] |= I , there exists {[’l]}l∈ L ∈ J ([’0]) such that [’l] e= [I ] for
any l∈L, which implies ∨l∈L ’l  I . Since [’0] [∨l∈L ’l], ’0  ∨l∈L ’l.
Therefore, ’0  I .
•  0 =’ ∗  :
if: {[’0]}∈ J ([’0]) and [’0] [’] ◦ [ ]. Moreover, by the induction hypothe-
sis, [’] |=’ and [ ] |=  . Therefore, [’0] |=’ ∗  ;
only if: since [’0] |=’ ∗  , there exists {[’l]}l∈ L ∈ J ([’0]) such that for any l∈L,
there exist [Jl]; [Kl] such that [’l] [Jl] ◦ [Kl], [Jl] |=’ and [Kl] |=  . By the
induction hypothesis, Jl ’ and Kl   for any l∈L. For any l∈L, since
[’l] [Jl ∗ Kl], ’l ’ ∗  . Since ’0 
∨
l∈L ’l, ’0 ’ ∗  .
•  0 =’−∗  :
if: for any [’1] such that [’1] |=’, by induction hypothesis, ’1 ’. Therefore,
’0 ∗’1   . Again, by the induction hypothesis, [’0 ∗’1] |=  . Equivalently,
[’0] ◦ [’1] |=  ;
only if: by the induction hypothesis, [’] |=’. Since [’0] |=’−∗  , [’0] ◦ [’] |=  .
By the induction hypothesis again, ’0 ∗ ’  . Therefore, ’0 ’−∗  .
We conclude this part with a simple example, a speciHc counter-model to the en-
tailment,
((p−∗⊥) ∧ ⊥) ∧ ((q−∗⊥)→ ⊥) |= (p ∗ q−∗⊥)→ ⊥;
used in Proposition 6. We deHne a preordered monoid M=(M; ◦;), where
• the carrier set M = {e; a;⊥};
• the order is e  ⊥ a;
• the multiplication is
◦ e a ⊥
e e a ⊥
a a ⊥ ⊥
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
• the Grothendieck topology is
J (⊥) = {{⊥}; ∅}; J (e) = {{e}}; J (a) = {{a}}:
DeHne an interpretation and forcing relation as follows:
• m |=p iQ m= a or m=⊥.
• m |=q iQ m= a or m=⊥.
• m |=⊥ iQ m=⊥.
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Now, e |=(p−∗⊥)→⊥ iQ for all n  e such that e =⊥ there is an l such that l |=p
and n ◦ l =⊥ iQ there exists l such that l |=p and l =⊥. Since a is such an l, we
have e |=(p−∗⊥)→⊥. However, e |=(p∗q−∗⊥)→⊥ iQ for any n  e such that n =⊥
there is an l such that l |=p ∗ q and l ◦ n =⊥ iQ there are l, l′ such that l |=p, l′ |=q
and l ◦ l′ =⊥ which cannot be so because, for any l and l′, if l |=p and l′ |=q, then
l ◦ l′=⊥. Therefore, e =| (p ∗ q−∗⊥)→⊥
Therefore, e |=((p−∗⊥)→⊥)∧ ((q−∗⊥)→⊥) but e =| ((p ∗ q−∗⊥)→⊥) in this
model.
5.4. The Pointers model as a Grothendieck sheaf
In Section 4.4, we presented a model where the combining operation ◦ is a partial
function. As promised in Section 4.4, we conclude our treatment of resource semantics
by showing that this model can be understood as a Grothendieck sheaf, i.e., within the
model-theoretic framework based on total monoids.
Let H⊥ be the set of heaps, extended with a new least element, ⊥. We can deHne
an operation ◦ in which h ◦ h′ is the union of h; h′ ∈H if they are disjoint and ⊥
otherwise. Also, ◦ is strict in both arguments and the unit is again the empty heap.
The ordering we take is the Jat one, in which ⊥ is least and all other elements are
incomparable.
We can deHne a Grothendieck simple topology on H⊥, by setting
J (⊥) = {{⊥}; ∅}
J (m) = {{m}} if m = ⊥
The points-to relation is extended so that ⊥ always forces it. Notice that since J (⊥)
contains ∅, it follows from the semantic clauses that ⊥ |=’ always holds.
The connection between the pointer model and this sheaf presentation can then be
stated as follows:
For every h∈H , h |=’ in the sheaf model just given iQ h |=’ in the pointer
model.
This does not mention ⊥ but, because of the way it is treated in the topology, the two
models do indeed agree on logical consequence:
 |= ’ in the sheaf model just given iQ  |= ’ in the pointer model:
Finally, the pointer model of Reynolds [19] can also be seen as a Grothendieck
sheaf model. The underlying set of worlds is H⊥, as above, but this time the ordering
on worlds is the one in which h h′ if the graph of h is a supergraph of the graph of
h′. This is an intuitionistic model, corresponding to Reynolds’ intuitionistic treatment
of pointers, whereas the previous one provides a model of Boolean BI.
6. Towards a theory of resource
We should like to conclude by being clear about what this paper does and does not
accomplish.
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Firstly, starting from a notion of resource (de)composition, we have shown how a
natural semantics of BI’s formulV may be obtained, and how a number of naturally
occurring examples Ht well with it. Further, we have shown completeness properties
of the semantics. We admit that our most general notion of model, the Grothendieck
semantics, is diNcult to motivate exclusively in terms of resources but it does allow
for a wider range of models, and has paved the way for new results [19]. In particular,
[19] shows the completeness of the simpler partial monoid semantics, which we would
argue can be regarded as a basic model of (de)composition.
Secondly, we do not claim to have constructed a good general theory of resource.
Whilst the theory we have presented is certainly general, it is not very speciHc to re-
source: our concrete computational models have a much richer resource-speciHc struc-
ture which is not captured by our general semantics. In a similar vein, we do not claim
to have established “the logic of resources”. There is currently no such logic: rather,
there are diQerent logics—including BI, linear logic, various logics used in AI—which
are “resource sensitive” in that they allow for models or interpretations in which a
notion of resource may be seen. None of them, however, provides an all-encompassing
account.
As we have indicated in Section 4, to obtain a richer theory would require a thorough
treatment of the dynamics of processes, their interaction with resources, and (say)
modal logics expressing the properties of interacting processes and resources.
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